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Cert to Minn. S.Ct. {Scott: 
Peterson, Yetka, dissenting) 
State/Criminal Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr challenges the suppression of resp's 
confession to a probation officer without Miranda warnings. 
2. FACTS AND DECISIONS BELOW: Resp was on probation 
for false imprisonment {he pleaded guilty to this lesser included 
7)'7} 7 ~~ ~ ~  t1/\ ..x 
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offense in a prosecution for criminal sexual conduct in the sec-
ond degree). The terms of his probation required him to partici-
pate in a treatment program, to report regularly to his probation 
officer, and to be truthful with her in all matters. After resp 
· underwent some treatment, his probation officer acquiesced in his 
desire to quit the treatment. She later learned from a counselor 
that in the course of treatment, resp had admitted the commission 
of a rape and murder in 1974 and had indicated that he had not 
been arrested because of a lack of evidence. She decided that 
she would have to turn the information over to the police, and 
she then wrote resp a letter asking him to contact her to discuss 
treatment for the remainder of his probation. He agreed to a 
meeting on Sept. 28, 1981, and appeared at the officer's office. 
She had not yet contacted the police or the prosecutor. When 
confronted with his admission to the counselor, resp stated that 
he was angry and "felt like seeing a lawyer." The officer told 
him that he would have to take that up elsewhere and proceeded to 
discuss the matter with him. He admitted to the rape and murder. 
The door remained unlocked throughout the meeting, and resp was 
allowed to leave at the end of the meeting. Resp was arrested 
and indicted for murder. 
At a pretrial suppression hearing, the 'n:: held that the con-
fession was admissible. The Minn. S.Ct. reversed. It recognized 
that the general rule is that the Fifth Amendment privilege must 
be timely invoked by a defendant but it stated that there are 
exceptions to the rule: e.g., when the interrogation is custodi-
al and therefore inherently coercive, or when a person is threat-
- - 3 - -
ened with the loss of his job if he refuses to answer. The court 
read Estelle v. Smith, 451 US 454 (1981), to suggest that when a 
defendant is under a court order to submit to a psychiatric ex-
amination, his statements cannot be used against him if he is not 
warned of his right to remain silent. Unlike the defendant in 
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 US 492 (1977), the resp was present un-
der legal compulsion, for he had been made to understand earlier 
that failure to appear for meetings would lead to an immediate 
request for a warrant. ALso, he was under court order to respond 
truthfully to the officer's questions, and the officer had sub-
stantial reason to believe that the answers were likely to be 
incriminating. There fore, the officer should have warned the 
resp of his right to refuse to answer. 
Justice Peterson dissented. Since the rule is that incrimi-
nating statements made to a parole officer can be used to prove a 
violation of parole, United States v. Rea, 678 F.2d 382 (CA2 
1982), he thought the statements here were admissible. Justice 
Yetka also dissented. He thought that the parolee's relationship 
with the officer was special, so that ordinary rules about custo-
dial interrogation would not apply. Also, he thought that this 
was not custodial interrogation. 
On remand, the TC dismissed the indictment, staying the dis-
missal pending disposition of the case by this Court. 
3. CONTENTIONS: A. Petr. Petr contends that the Minn. 
S.Ct. has unduly expanded the meaning of "custodial interroga-
tion." The Court held in Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 us 492 (1977), 
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that Miranda is not automatically applicable to noncustodial sit-
uations simply because a reviewing court concludes that there was 
a "coercive environment." Here, according to petr, resp was free 
to invoke his Fifth Amendment rights and his failure to do so 
amounts to a waiver. Further, the totality of the circumstances 
show that resp's confession was voluntary: resp is a 29-year-old 
high school graduate with significant experience with the crimi-
nal justice system, and the interview was brief and conducted in 
familiar surroundings. 
Petr contends that the holding below creates substantial 
problems in the administration of just ice, because it will re-
quire Miranda warnings in noncustodial discussions with any gov-
ernment agent. 
Petr further contends that there is a conflict among the 
lower courts as to whether statements to a probation officer can 
be used against the probationer. See, e.g., United States v. 
Miller, 643 F. 2d 713 (CAlO 1978); United STates v. Holmes, 594 
F. 2d 116 7 (CAB 1979) ; People v. Parker, 421 NYS2d 5 61 ( 1979) ; 
State v. Roberts, 544 P.2d 754 (Wash. App. 1976). 
B. Resp. Given the two factual findings made by the Minn. 
S.Ct., resp contends that this case just involved the application 
of settled principles. The officer intentionally used the com-
pulsory processes of the court for the purpose of gathering evi-
dence for the police, a~d the officer repeatedly told resp that 
she was questioning him only because she was concerned about his 
treatment -- even after he stated his desire to call a lawyer. 
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Under Estelle v. Smith, supra, and Garner v. United States, 424 
US 454 (1976), the decision below was correct. There is no con-
flict with the cases cited by petr, because in the cases dealing 
with use of statements to establish a separate crime, the proba-
· tion officers were not deliberately attempting to incriminate the 
defendants for the purpose of initiating or aiding a er iminal 
investigation. 
Further, resp argues that he did attempt to invoke the priv-
ilege in a timely fashion when he stated that he wanted to call a 
lawyer, Fare v. Michael c., 442 US 707 (1979), but the probation 
officer failed to honor his assertion of the privilege. 
c. Petr's reply. Petr urges rejection of resp' s argument 
that he invoked the privilege, because the TC found that the 
resp's reference to calling a lawyer was in the context of a civ-
il suit against the counselor for breach of confidentiality. 
Also, resp's reconciliation of the cases asserted to conflict is 
faulty because the Minn. courts never found that the probation 
officer was using the compulsory processes of the court to fur-
ther a criminal investigation or that she deceived him. 
4. DISCUSSION: Resp' s argument that he attempted to 
invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege is without merit, given the 
finding by the TC that he stated that he wanted to talk to a law-
yer only in the context of a civil suit against the counselor. 
The real quest ion is whether th is is a situation in which 
his failure to claim his Fifth Amendment privilege at the time 
. ., - - 6 - -
constitutes a waiver. On that issue, I think that the result 
below was correct, though not necessarily for the reasons given 
by the court. Had the state attempted to introduce resp's state-
ments to his counselor, Estelle v. Smith would require suppres-
sion. In this case, as in Smith, the statement to the psychia-
trist was compelled and the defendant had no idea that his state-
ments might be used against him. Although the opinion did men-
tion it, Smith did not focus much on the custodial setting, and I 
do not think that that provides a basis for distinction since the 
Minn. courts found that resp here was compelled to attend meet-
ings with his probation officer, and the same court order re-
quired his attendance at treatment sessions. Thus, Smith would 
prevent introduction of the statements made to the counselor. 
The statements to the probation officer were clearly the fruits 
of the statements to the counselor and should therefore be inad-
missible. 
Consequently, this case would not be a good one to decide 
the question whether incriminating statements made in response to 
the questions of probation officers are inadmissible without 
Miranda warnings, and I recommend denial. 
There is a response and a reply. 
December 16, 1982 Smalley opn in petn 
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From: Justice White 
" " N 1 3 1983 Circulated: _ ______ _ 
Recirculated: _____ ___ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
MINNESOTA v. MARSHALL DONALD MURPHY 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME 
COURT OF MINNESOTA 
No. 82-827. Decided January-, 1983 
The petition for writ of certiorari is denied. 
JUSTICE WHITE, dissenting. 
In 1980, in connection with a prosecution for criminal sex-
ual conduct, respondent Marshall Murphy pleaded guilty to 
the crime of false imprisonment. Murphy was sentenced to 
a prison term of sixteen months, which was stayed, and three 
years probation. The terms of re~pondent's probation re-
quired, among other th~ that he participate in a treat-
ment program, report to his probation officer as directed, 
and be truthful with the probation officer in all matters. In 
Septerriber,1981, the probation officer learned from a coun-
selor in respondent's treatment program that during the 
course of treatment, he had admitted to a rape and murder in 
1974. The prob3:tion officer, after discussions with her su-
pervisor, determined that this information should be given to 
the police. The probation officer then wrote respondent and 
asked him to contact her in order to discuss a treatment plan 
for the remainder of the probation period. 
Upon receipt of the letter, respondent arranged to meet 
with the probation officer on September 28, 1981. At the be-
ginning of the meeting, the probation officer told respondent 
about the information she had received from the counselor. 
Respondent became angry and stated that he "felt like calling 
a lawyer." The probation officer told respondent that the 
relationship between the crimes which respondent had admit-
ted to the counselor and the incident that led to his false 
imprisonment conviction indicated a need for further treat-
ment. During the course of the meeting, respondent told 
T o,__yv-:- +t.s fl... ._:,,~ -..,., 
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2 MINNESOTA v. MURPHY 
the probation officer that he had committed the rape and 
murder, but that he had been using drugs heavily at the time. 
At the conclusion of the meeting, the officer told respondent 
that she had a duty to relay the information to the authorities 
and encouraged him to turn himself in to the police. Re-
spondent then left the office. Two days later, respondent 
called his probation officer and told her that he had been ad-
vised by counsel not to surrender himself to the police. The 
officer then procured the issuance of an arrest and detention 
warrant from the judge wlio had sentenced respondent on the 
false i mprisonment charge. On October 29, 1981, a state 
grand jury indictment was returned charging respondent 
with first degree murder. 
Respondent sought suppression of his confession on the 
ground that it was obtained in violation of his Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendment rights. The trial court found that re-
spondent was._!lot "in cust~" at the time of the statement 
and that the c~s neither compelled nor involun-
tary despite the absence of warnings similar to those re-
quired by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). The 
Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. That court found that 
"as a matter of due process, the [probation officer] should 
have'"°w§e~lreii?~erit] of his privilege agamst self-incrim-
ination before she questioned him and that her failure to do 
so, when she had already decided to report his answers to the 
police, bars use of [respondent's] confession at his trial." 324 
N. W. 2d 340, 344 (Minn. 1982). Although the court con-
ceded that respondent was not "in custody" in the usual 
sense, it found support in our opinion in Estelle v. Smith, 451 
U. S. 454 (1981), for the proposition that if a person is "under 
legal compulsion, in the form of a court order, to submit to 
[an] examination" then Miranda-type warnings may be re-
quired. 
Whether a statement made by a probationer to his proba-
tion officer without prior warnings is admissible in a subse-
quent criminal proceeding has been the subject of varying de-
cisions in both state and federal courts. See United States v. 
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not required prior to conversation where parolee "was nei-
ther deprived of his freedom of action nor questioned in a co-
ercive environment"); United States v. Holmes, 594 F. 2d 
1167, 1171(CA81979) (no warnings required prior to proba-
tion officer's discussion with defendant where defendant not 
in custody or charged with a crime); People v. W, 24 N.Y.S. 
2d 732, -, 249 N.E. 2d 882, 883--884 (NY 1969) (no 
warnings required prior to probation officer's question where 
defendant is not in the "sort of incommunicado, police-domi-
nated atmosphere of custodial interrogation and overbearing 
of the subject's will at which the Miranda rule was aimed.") 
The Minnesota Supreme Court's conclusion that respond-
ent's statements to the probation officer are protected by the 
Fifth Amendment even though he failed to invoke the privi-
lege places its decision in conflict with decisions of other state 
and federal appellate courts. Because the issue is an impor-
tant one for the administration of criminal justice, this Court 
should grant this petition for certiorari. 
- -
January 13 , 1983 
82-827 Minnesota v . Murphy 
Dear Byron: 
Plea!.=:e add my name to your dissent from the denjaJ. 
of certiorari. 
Just ice White 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
- - January 14, 1983 Court ................... . ·voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned ................. . , 19 .. . No. 
82-827 
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Minnesota v. Murphy 
Robert M. Couch September 22, 1983 
Argument scheduled for Wednesday, October 12, 1983. 
Question Presented 
Whether a probationer's confession to his probation officer with-
out Miranda warnings is admissible in the probationer's subse-
quent trial. 
Ju.,~;.__ ~(tp!~ 
~~ ~ ~ ~~ ~
~~I-cl-~~~. 
bench memo: Minn. v. Murphy -
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C. Decisions Below 
II. Discussion 
A. Petitioners Contentions 
B. Respondents Contentions 
C. SG's Views 
D. Analysis 
III. Conclusion 













bench memo: Minn. v. Murphy - - page 3 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Statutes 
The only relevant statutory material is the 5th and 14th 
Amendments to the United States Constitution. I don't think it's 
necessary to quote them. 
B. Facts 
Resp Murphy pleaded guilty to false imprisonment in 1980. He 
received a stayed prison term of 16 months, and 3 years proba-
tion. One condition of his probation was that he had to partici-
pate in a treatment program for sexual of fenders. The TC also 
instructed him to report in a truthful manner to his probation 
officer, Mara Widseth. - -~)t tf§i ~ On September 22, ~, a counselor from resp's treatment pro-
~ gram told W1 seth that during the course of treatment resp had 
r ✓admitted to a 1974 rape and murder. Widseth decided that she 
~ would have to report resp's confession to the police, but she did 
)1,v'1'"~ot get in touch with the authorities until after her next meet-
~~ with resp. Widseth wrote resp a letter asking him to make an 
~ appointment with her to discuss a treatment plan for the remain-
der of his probation. Resp agreed to meet with Widseth in her 
off ice on September 28. /-- Yh.<. ~f::w..t ~ ~ 
At the September 28 meeting, Widseth confronted resp with the 
report of his admission during treatment, and told him that he 
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needed additional treatment. Resp expressed outrage that his 
counselor had betrayed his trust, and commented that "he felt 
like calling a lawyer." Petr told him that he could take care of --------------that later • 
..___...---..., 
Resp then confessed to the 1974 rape and murder. 
Widseth told resp that she would have to report him to the police 
and encouraged him to turn himself in. Widseth allowed resp to 
return home to make up his mind. 
On September 30, resp phoned Widseth and indicated that, 
after consulting an attorney, he had decided not to turn himself 
in. On October 2, Widseth had an arrest warrant issued based on 
resp's refusal to submit to additional treatment. On October 29, 
the grand jury indicted resp for murder. 
C. Decisions Below 
Before trial, resp tried to have his confession to Widseth 
suppressed on the ground that she had not given him any Miranda 
warnings. The TC refused because resp was not in custody at the 
time of his confession and his confession was voluntary. The TC 
then certified the question of the admissibility of the confes-
sion to the Minn. S. Ct. 
The Minn. S. Ct. reversed the TC. In summarizing its reason-
' 
ing, the court stated: ~ ~
"Because of the compulsory nature of he meeting, be-
cause defendant was un er cour order to respond truth-
fully to his agent's questions, and because the agent 
had substantial reason to believe that defendant's an-
swers were likely to be incriminating, we conclude 
that, as a matter of federal constitutional law, any 
failure on defendant's part to claim the privilege when 
he was questioned does not bar his later reliance on 
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the privilege in seeking suppression of his 
confession." Joint Appendix, at A-10. 
Two justices wrote separate dissenting opinions. Justice Peter-
son would have found the confession admissible by relying on 
United States v. Rea, 678 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1982) • 1 Justice 
Yetka would have affirmed the TC on the ground that resp was not 
"in custody" at the time of his confession. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Petitioner's Contentions 
Petr argues that the Minn. S. Ct. 's reasoning is faulty be-
cause it is based on two crucial misconceptions. The first mis-
conception is that a noncustodial meeting with a probation offi-
cer is inherently coercive. The interview at issue here, unlike 
✓ 
a custodial police interrogation, took place in familiar sur-
roundings and Murphy ~ etained his freedom of action at all tumes. 
The absence of any threats, intimidat~on, or force indicates that 
:: 
Widseth did not compel Murphy's confession. The fact that a pro-
bationer attends a meeting and answers questions under a court 
order does not make his answers compelled in the 5th Amendment 
1 In Rea, the CA2 ruled that statements given by a probationer 
to his probation officer without Miranda warnings were admissible 
~ 1 _,,,,- in a hearing to determine whether he had violated his probation. 
'rl..O'U,-) Justice Peterson could see no conceptual difference between 
admitting statements that result in imprisonment for violating 
probation and those resulting in a murder conviction. 
• 
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sense. The Court has held that one who testifies under court 
order in a civil trial or before a grand jury must claim his 5th 
Amendment privilege at that time or it will be deemed waived in 
subsequent criminal prosecutions. A probation interview involves 
no more compelling circumstances than civil trials and grand jury 
witnesses. 
The Minn. s. Ct.'s second misconception, according to petr, 
is that the need for Miranda warnings is dependent, in part, on 
the probation officer's knowledge at the time of the questioning 
that the probationer may be guilty of a crime. Petr contends 
that the proper inquiry is whether the confession is compelled, 
not the reason for the questioning. Thus, the officer's state of 
mind is irrelevant. 
Finally, petr argues that Widseth's conduct was not a viola-
tion of substantive due process because, considering the totality 
of the circumstances, her conduct was not fundamentally unfair. 
B. Respondent's Contentions 
Resp contends that a confession is not admissible, in the 
absence of Miranda warnings whenever three factors exist. The 
(D II '-L 
first factor is the existence of compelling circumstances. These 
circumstances are present when an interrogation, whether custodi-
al or noncustodial, is conducted by a judicial officer who has 
authority to compel truthful answers. The second factor is 
~ hether the government official has substantial reason to believe 
that the answers to his questions will incriminate the individ-
• 
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ual. The relevance of this factor, according to respondent, is 
that it determines whether the defendant must assert his 5th 
Amendment privilege in order to invoke it at trial. If the gov-
ernment official has no knowledge of a defendant's culpability at 
the time of questioning, the government would unwitingly immunize 
the defendant's incriminatory testimony if the "assert-to-invoke" 
rule did not exist. 2 Where the judicial officer can anticipate 
the incriminatory testimony, there is no reason for the rule. 
The third factor ~ ether the interrogation takes place in 
unsupervised surroundings and the defendant has an opportunity to 
consult a lawyer. Resp asserts that, in the past, the Court has 
required a defendant to assert his privilege to avoid waiving it 
only in situations where an impartial observer has supervised the 
interrogation. Resp contends that all three factors exist in 
this case and, therefore, the privilege against self-
incrimination is self-executing. Resp also argues that the pro-
bation process will benefit by the Minn. S. Ct. 's holding because 
it will promote trust between probationers and probation offi-
cers. 
C. SG's Views 
The SG has filed an amicus brief which argues for reversal of 
~,d-£J9 
2 r do not understand how the government could inadvertently ) 
immunize a witness. The authority cited for this novel 
proposition (a law review article and a Frankfurter dissent) o 
not lend direct support to the proposition. 
• 
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the Minn. s. Ct. The SG restates many of the arguments found in 
petr 's brief. One new argument found in the SG's brief is that 
:5/;/~ 
~ 
the confession should be admitted because a probationer is in a ~ 
different posture than most people questioned by authorities. As 
a result, resp's constitutional rights are limited to the extent 
necessary to accomodate the government's i nterest in the proba-
tion process. The SG submits that requiring Miranda warnings in ( 
situations like the one here would hamper probation officers in 
the performance of their duties. 
Two other amici curiae have filed briefs. The National Asso-
ciation of Criminal Defense Lawyers has filed a brief in support 
of resp. The Int' 1 and Minn. Ass 'ns of Chiefs of Police have 
joined the Arner icans for Effective Law Enforcement in filing a 
~ 
brief in support of petr. Neither brief breaks any new ground. 
D. Analysis 
This is the first bench memo I have written where I think I 
have a somewhat definitive answer--the Minn. s. Ct. was wrong. 
The Court has recognized the long-established rule that an indi-
vidual who is under compulsion to make disclosures to government 
officials and who reveals incr iminat~ng information instead of 
claiming his 5th Amendment privilege has lost the benefit of the -
privilege. Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 559 (1980); 
United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1970). Under this 
general rule, Murphy would have no right to have his confession 
excluded because he did not assert his 5th Amendment privilege at -------------------------------
? 
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the time of his conversation The Court has, howev-
er, created exceptions to the general rule and resp feels that 
his case either falls within one of those exceptions or deserves 
the establishment of a new exception. 
The Court has recognized three exceptions in the past. See 
Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 657-665 (1976). The first 
is the custodial interrogation exception of Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 u.s. 436 (1966). In Miranda, the Court determined that a 
defendant would not be deemed to have foregone his 5th Amendment 
privilege unless he has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of 
his rights. If the defendant is in police custody, the police 
must guarantee that the defendant knows his rights by giving him 
what are now known as Miranda warnings. The Court felt that 
these special rules were necessary because of the unusually coer-
cive nature of custodial interrogations. In most custodial in-
terrogations the defendant is thrust into strange surroundings, 
held incommunicado, and questioned by law enforcement off ice rs 
out of sight of any impartial observers. Police often are 
trained to use the frightening aspects of custodial interroga-
tions as psychological coercion to get the defendant to confess. 
Often, police will use, or threaten to use physical coercion. 
Because a defendant will feel compelled to incriminate himself in 
these circumstances, the Court held that Miranda warnings and an 
express waiver of 5th Amendment rights are prerequisites to the 
admission of a confession made during custodial interrogations. 
Resp's confession does not fall within this exception because 
he was not in custody at the time of his conversation with 
t1--
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Widseth. The Court has held that the pronouncements of Miranda 
do not come into play until after police have taken a suspect 
into custody, i.e., deprived him of his freedom of action. Ore-
.9.2.!!. v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494 (1977). Even if the ques-
tioning takes place in a "coercive environment," Miranda warnings 
are not required until the suspect is taken into custody. Id., 
at 495; see Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 560 (1980). 
- ~ 
Resp does not contend that he was in custody or that he had been ~ 
~LI 
deprived of his freedom of action. ~ J..,,i....., 
The <econd exception applies to self-incrimination throug~ 
filing or failing to file tax returns. In Marchetti v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) and Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 
62 (1968), the Court held that gamblers could exercise their 5th 
Amendment rights by not filing federal occupational and excise 
taxe returns. The Court reasoned that an assertion of the 5th 
Amendment privilege on the tax returns would be incriminating in 
and of itself. Therefore, gamblers should not be required to 
assert the privilege to preserve it. The Court refused to extend 
this principle to income tax forms in Garner v. United States, 
424 U.S., at 659-660. I don't think the limited gambling tax 
exception applies to resp in this case. 
The < hird exception to the "assert-to-preserve" rule comes 
into play when the defendant is subject to a penalty if he exer-
cises his right to remain silent. The leading case in this area 
is Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). In Garrity a 
group of policemen were questioned concerning "ticket-fixing." 
The policemen were told that they could refuse to answer the 
• 
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questions, but if they refused, they would be subject to removal 
from off ice. The Court found that the threat of losing their 
jobs had "disabled [the policemen] from making a free and ra-
tional choice" between remaining silent and answering the ques-
tions. Id., at 497. 
The Garrity exception does not seem to apply to resp confes-
~ ~>L sion. 
~ 1974 
Widseth did not threaten resp to get him to talk about the 
rape/murder. The cases seem to indicate that Widseth could -
~ not have revoked petr's probation for invoking his 5th Amendment 
~ privilege. Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514-515 (1967). Al-
~--~ ,r ,:,sp may have felt some compulsion to talk with Widseth 
fA9 ~ ecause truthful discourse with his probation officer was a 
court-ordered condition of his probation, that compulsion is no 
7frJ( greater than when a witness is ordered to testify before a grand 
In both those cases the witness must ~
1
j~ :L-,.or in a civil trial. 
~ ~ ; rt 5th Amendment rights in order to preserve them. United 
~ States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 580 (1976); United States v. ~-~ 
~ Kordel, 397 U.S., at 10. j 
~, For many of the same reasons that the Garrity exception does 
~:~ apply, I do not think that the Court should create a new ex-
~ 
ception for this sort of case. Resp contends that any time a 
defendant who is suspected of criminal conduct is judicially com-
pelled to speak with a government official under circumstances 
that are not subject to the scrutiny of impartial observers, the 
defendant should retain his 5th Amendment privilege even if he 
does not assert it. Rather than create a special exception, the 
proper analysis is to consi1rr: \al tl ~_he .facts of th_l..l-t~ise_ to de-
(~· ~<.,~~,.> l~ ~ -~ N'N-0 ~~4 Ao wJJ.., ".>~~. r lq,":) ~xo~ 
~u}_ -u...'S--¼ ~\~~r~~ ~"":-'~~ ·~ w~ r~~~ th~ ~ It'.~\,~ . 
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termine whether resp' s confess ion can be characterized as one 
where "the behavior of ••• law enforcement officials was such as 
to overbear [resp' s] will to resist and bring about confessions 
not freely self-determined •••. " Beckwith v. United States, 425 
u.s. 341, 348 (1976). In my humble opinion, resp's will was not 
overborne by Widseth's conduct. 
The conversation took place in Widseth's office, the location 
of over a dozen meetings between Widseth and resp. Thus, resp -~
was familiar with his surroundings. Resp came to the meeting at 
an hour that met his convenience and throughout the meeting the 
door was unlocked and resp was unrestrained. Resp left Widseth's 
office a free man and returned home. There was no evidence that 
Widseth threatened resp or physically abused him. Although 
Widseth did not give resp any Miranda type warnings, resp had 
been through the legal mill before and undoubtedly knew his 
rights. All in all, Widseth did not "compel" resp to incriminate 
himself. He confessed voluntarily, thereby foregoing his right 
to remain silent. Cf. Fare v. Michael c., 442 U.S. 707, 726-727 
(1979). 
In many ways the 
✓ 
facts in Oregon v. 
facts of this case are analogous to the 
Mathiason, 429 U.S., at 492-493. In 
Mathiason, a police officer asked the defendant to meet him at 
the neighborhood police station to discuss a burglary. The de-
fendant went to the police station of his own volition and met 
alone with the police officer in an office with the door closed. 
The defendant was told that he was not under arrest. The police 
officer questioned the defendant about the burglary and falsely 
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stated that the defendant's fingerprints had been found at the 
scene of the crime. The defendant then confessed to the crime. 
The Oregon s. Ct. held that the defendant's confession was inad-
missible because he had not received any Miranda warnings. The 
W-e.. 
U.S. S. Ct. reversed stating that the coercive elements of the 
interview and the policeman's suspicions of guilt were not enough 
to require exclusion of the confession. 
actions were less coercive than those 
Mathiason. 
In my view, Widseth 's I 
of the policeman in ~ 
The only opinions of the Court that give me pause are Estelle 
-v-' 
v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) and ' Roberts v. United States, 445 
U.S. 552, 558 (1980). In Estelle, the TC ordered the defendant 
to undergo a psychiatric examination to determine whether he was 
competent to stand trial. The psychiatrist did not warn the de-
fendant that his statements could be used against him. The de-
fendant did not have a lawyer present at the examination. The 
psychiatrist testified against the defendant at the sentencing 
phase of the trial on the issue of future dangerousness. The 
Court held that the psychiatrist's testimony was inadmissible 
because he had not given the defendant any Miranda warnings. You 
concurred in the Court's judgment on 6th Amendment grounds, i. 
~, the defendant's counsel should have received notice of the 
upcoming psychiatric examination. Although resp argues that he 
talked to Widseth under court order, just as the defendant in 
Estelle was ordered to undergo the examination, I think the cases 
are distinguishable. The Court in Estelle relied heavily on the . 
fact that the defendant was in custody and, therefore, Miranda 
~ --
' 
7 C. j'. 
~ (jA,-
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applied. As discussed above, resp was not in custody. Thus, 
Estelle is not on point. 
In Roberts v. United States, the Court (through Powell, J.} 
stated: 
"The Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination is not self-executing. At least where 
the Government has no substantial reason to believe ~~ 
that the requested disclosures are likely to be incrim-
inating, the privilege may not be relied upon unless it 
is invoked in a timely fashion." Id., at 559 (emphasis 
mine}. --
I do not know how much importance you intended to attach to the 
government's suspicions. Other cases have held that the govern-
ment's belief that a defendant may have incriminating information 
is not controlling. See Oregon v. Mathiason,_429 U.S., at 495; 
Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S., at 345; cf. Rhode Island v. 
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 n. 7 (1980) (suspicions relevant to de-
termination of whether police conduct constitutes 
"interrogation"}. I think the language in Roberts is dicta, but 
it is troubling enough that I thought I should bring it to your ~ 
attention. 
One final issue raised by the resp is that his statement to 
Widseth that "he felt like calling a lawyer" should have been 
;:::J 
interpreted fay Widseth as a request for a lawyer and she should 
have ceased questioning resp until his lawyer arrived. The TC 
that resp's statement was made in the context of a civil 
ction against his treatment counselor rather than a request that 
he have the assistance of an attorney at the meeting. The Minn. 
S. Ct. did not address the TC's finding. The TC interpretation 
-------------
seems to be supported by the record. When viewed in context, 
resp statement was the equivalent of saying: "I have half a mind 
~? 
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to sue that counselor." That statement should not have brought a 
halt to Widseth's questioning. 
The resp does not make a substantive due process argument 
even though petr anticipates such an argument in its brief. I do ----
not view Widseth's conduct as fundamentally unfair. Therefore, 
even if resp had pursued a due process argument, it would not 
change my recommendation. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Minn. S. Ct. should be reversed. Resp was not entitled 
to Miranda warnings and Widseth did not overbear his free will. 
Widseth was correct in not interpreting resp' s reference to a 
lawyer as an invocation of his right to counsel before question-
ing. 
- -
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I~ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82--827 
MINNESOTA, PETITIONER v. MARSHALL 
DONALD MURPHY 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF MINNESOTA 
[November - , 1983] 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case, respondent Murphy, who was on probation, 
made incriminating admissions during a meeting with his pro-
bation officer. The issue before us is whether the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the introduction into evi-
dence of the admissions in Murphy's subsequent criminal 
prosecution. 
I 
In 1974, Marshall Murphy was twice questioned by Minne-
apolis Police concerning the rape and murder of a teenage 
girl. No charges were then brought. In 1980, in connection 
with a prosecution for criminal sexual conduct arising out of 
an unrelated incident, Murphy pleaded guilty to a reduced 
charge of false imprisonment. He was sentenced to a prison 
term of sixteen months, which was suspended, and three 
years' probation. The terms of Murphy's probation re-
quired, among other things, that he participate in a treat-
ment program for sexual offenders at Alpha House, report to 
his probation officer as directed, and be truthful with the pro-
bation officer "in all matters." Failure to comply with these 
conditions, Murphy was informed, could result in his return 
to the sentencing court for a probation revocation hearing. 
App. to Pet. for Cert. C33--C35. 
Murphy met with his probation officer at her office ap-
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out incident until July 1981, when the officer learned that he 
had abandoned the treatment program. The probation offi-
cer then wrote to Murphy and informed him that failure to 
set up a meeting would "result in an immediate request for a 
warrant." Id., at C35. At a meeting in late July, the offi-
cer agreed not to seek revocation of probation for nonpartici-
pation in the treatment program since Murphy was employed 
and doing well in other areas. 
In September 1981, an Alpha House counselor informed 
the probation officer that, during the course of treatment, 
Murphy had admitted to a rape and murder in 1974. After 
discussions with her superior, the officer determined that the 
police should have this information.' She then wrote to 
Murphy and asked him to contact her to discuss a treatment 
plan for the remainder of his probationary period. 2 Al-
though she did not contact the police before the meeting, the 
probation officer knew in advance that she would report any 
incriminating statements. 
Upon receipt of the letter, Murphy arranged to meet with 
his probation officer in her office on September 28, 1981. 
The officer opened the meeting by telling Murphy about the 
1 The parties stipulated in the trial court that Alpha House was covered 
by federal statutes providing for the confidentiality of patient records in 
federally assisted drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs, 21 U. S. C. 
§ 1175 and 42 U. S. C. § 4582, and the regulations adopted pursuant 
thereto, 42 CFR pt. 2 (1982). Although the Alpha House counselor legiti-
mately informed respondent's probation officer of his incriminating admis-
sions, we assume, without deciding, that the counselor could not have pro-
vided the information to the police. See id., at§§ 2.39(a), 2.63; Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 6. We assume, as well, that the probation officer could not have 
made the counselor's information available for use in a criminal prosecu-
tion. See id. , at § 2.39(d); Tr. of Oral Arg. 6-7. 
2 It is unclear whether the probation officer could have ordered Murphy 
to pursue additional treatment as a condition of probation. App. to Pet. 
for Cert. C14 (testimony of Mara Widseth). But there is no evidence that 
she used treatment as a subterfuge or that her sole purpose was to obtain 
incriminating statements for the police. Under our view of the case, such 
a purpose would not change the result. Post, at --. 
-
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information she had received from the Alpha House counselor 
and expressing her belief that this information evinced his 
continued need for treatment. Murphy became angry about 
what he considered to be a breach of his confidences and 
stated that he "felt like calling a la~er." 3 The probation 
officer replied thatMurphy w ould have to deal with that 
problem outside the office; for the moment, their primary 
concern was the relationship between the crimes that Mur-
phy had admitted to the Alpha House counselor and the inci-
dent that led to his conviction for false imprisonment. 
During the course of the meeting, Murphy denied the false 
imprisonment charge, admitted that he had committed the 
rape and murder, and attempted to persuaae the probation 
officer tliat further treatment was unnecessary because sev-
eral extenuating circumstances explained the prior crimes. 
At the conclusion of the meeting, the officer told Murphy that 
she had a duty to relay the information to the authorities and 
encouraged him to turn himself in. Murphy then left the of-
fice. Two days later, Murphy called his probation officer 
and told her that he had been advised by counsel not to sur-
re11.der hillJ..self to the police. The officer then procured the 
issuance of an arrest and detention order from the judge who 
3 The trial court concluded that Murphy's statement did not constitute 
an invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination: "[W]hatever his 
real intent may have been, we are persuaded by the probation officer's tes-
timony that he did not express [the] desire [to talk to an attorney] in any 
context other than a civil suit for the breach of confidentiality." App. to 
Pet. for Cert. B13-B14. The Minnesota Supreme Court did not reach this 
question, and, although we see no reason to question the trial court's fac-
tual finding, our analysis of the case makes further consideration unnec-
essary. Although a request for a lawyer during custodial interrogation is 
sufficient to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination, Fare v. Mi-
chael C. , 442 U. S. 707, 709 (1979), Murphy was not in custody, post, at 
--, and he had no federal right to have an attorney present at the meet-
ing. See United States v. R ea, 678 F. 2d 382, 390 (CA2 1982); People v. 
Ronald W ., 31 App. Div. 2d 163, 165, 295 N. Y. S. 2d 767, 769 (1968), aff'd, 
24 N. Y. 2d 732, 249 N. E. 2d 882, 302 N. Y. S. 2d 260 (1969); Hughes v. 
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had sentenced Murphy on the false imprisonment charge. 
On October 29, 1981, a State grand jury returned an indict-
ment charging Murphy with first-degree murder. 
Murphy sought to suppress testimony concerning his con-
fession on the ground that it was obtained in violation of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court found 
that he was not "in custody'' at the time of the statement and 
that the confession was neither compelled nor involuntary de-
spite the absence of warnings similar to those required by 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). The Minnesota 
Supreme Court reversed on federal constitutional grounds. 
Although recognizing that the Fifth Amendment privilege 
generally is not self-executing, it concluded that, notwith-
standing the lack of custody in the usual sense, Murphy's fail-
ure to claim the privilege when he was questioned was not 
fatal to his claim "[b]ecause of the compulsory nature of the 
meeting, because [Murphy] was under court order to respond 
truthfully to his agent's questions, and because the agent had 
substantial reason to believe that [Murphy's] answers were 
likely to be incriminating." 324 N. W. 2d 340, 344 (Minn. 
1982). In the court's view, "the agent should have warned 
[Murphy] of his privilege against self-incrimination before 
she questioned him and . . . her failure to do so, when she 
had already decided to report his answers to the police, bars 
use of [Murphy's] confession at this trial." Ibid. 
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among state and 
federal courts concerning whether a statement made by a 
probationer to his probation officer without prior warnings is 
admissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding, 459 U. S. 
-- (1983). 4 We now reverse. 
• Compare, e. g., United States v. Steele, 419 F . Supp. 1385, 1386-1387 
(W. D. Pa. 1976); People v. Garcia, 240 Cal. App. 2d 9, 12-13, 49 Cal. 
Rptr. 146, 148 (1966); and State v. Lekas, 201 Kan. 579, 582-584, 442 P. 2d 
11, 15-16 (1968), with, e. g., United States v. Miller, 643 F. 2d 713, 715 
(CAlO 1981); United States v. Holmes, 594 F. 2d 1167 (CA8), cert. denied, 
444 U. S. 873 (1979); Nettles v. State, 248 So. 2d 259, 260 (Fla. App. 1971); 
-
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The Fifth Amendment, in relevant part, provides that no 
person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself." It has long been held that this prohi-
bition not only permits a person to refuse to testify against 
himself at a criminal trial in which he is a defendant, but also 
"privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in 
any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, 
where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal 
proceedings." Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S. 70, 77 (1973). 
In all such proceedings, 
"a witness protected by the privilege may rightfully 
refuse to answer unless and until he is protected at least 
against the use of his compelled ~nswers and evidence 
derived therefrom in any subsequent criminal case in 
which he is a defendant. . . . Absent such protection, if 
he is nevertheless compelled to answer, his answers are 
inadmissible against him in a later criminal prosecution." 
Id., at 78. 
A defendant does not lose this protection by reason of his con-
viction of a crime; notwithstanding that a defendant is impris-
oned or on probation at the time he makes incriminating 
statements, if those statements are compelled they are inad-
missible in a subsequent trial for a crime other than that for 
which he has been convicted. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 
425 U. S. 308, 316 (1976). 5 The issue in this case is whether 
Connell v. State, 131 Ga. App. 213, 205 S. E. 2d 513, 514 (1974); State v. 
Hartman, 281 N. W. 2d 639, 643--644 (Iowa App. 1979); and Pea,ple v. 
Parker, 101 Misc. 2d 800, 802--S04, 421 N. Y. S. 2d 561, 562--563 (1979). 
5 Although probation is a privilege that offenders may not necessarily 
demand as a constitutional right, Burns v. United States, 287 U. S. 216, 
220 (1932), probationers should not be deemed to have forfeited their Fifth 
Amendment right to refrain from providing evidence that could be used 
against them in subsequent criminal proceedings in exchange for the sen-
tencing authority's "act of grace." The "act of grace" theory has been 
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the Fifth Amendment right that Murphy enjoyed was vio-
lated by the admission into evidence at his trial for another 
crime of the prior statements made by him to his probation 
officer. 
A 
We note first that the general obligation to appear and an-
swer questions truthfully dia not m itself convert Murpliy's 
otherwise volunta statements into compelled ones. In 
that respect, Murphy was in no et er pos1t10n nan the ordi-
nary witness at a trial or before a grand jury who is subpoe-
naed and sworn to tell the truth and is obligated to answer on 
the pain of contempt, unless he invokes the privilege and 
shows that he faces a realistic threat of incriminating himself. 
The answers of such a witness to uestions ut to him are not 
~
co~pelled within the mearnl!g of the Fifth Amendment unless 
the witness is required to answer over his valid claim of the 
privilege. This much is reasonably clear from our cases. 
~ sffiis Court has long acknowledged, 
"[t]he [Fifth] Amendment speaks of compulsion. It 
does not preclude a witness from testifying voluntarily in 
matters which may incriminate him. If, therefore, he 
desires the protection of the privilege, he must claim it 
or he will not be considered to have been 'compelled' 
(1969), and since our decisions in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 
(1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778 (1973), the theory has lost 
whatever vitality it once might have had. See id., at 782, n. 4. The once-
popular "contract" theory of probation, under which the agreement to 
abide by various conditions was characterized as consideration for an offer 
of exemption from imprisonment, is also incapable of supporting the con-
clusion that an offender who has accepted an offer of probation has thereby 
waived his Fifth Amendment privilege in toto. The contract analogy is 
faulty since "[t]he law of contract is posited upon the notion of an equality 
of bargaining position between parties which culminates in a voluntary 
agreement. However, defendants are not in a position to bargain with a 
court because virtually any condition is preferable to jail." Best & Birzon, 
Conditions of Probation: An Analysis, 51 Geo. L. J. 809, 832-833 (1963). 
Like the "act of grace" theory, the "contract" theory was deprived of force 
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within the meaning of the Amendment." United States 
v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424, 427 (1943) (footnote omitted). 
This principle has been applied in cases involving a variety of 
criminal and noncriminal investigations. See, e.g., United 
States v. Kordel, 397 U. S. 1, 7-10 (1970); Rogers v. United 
States, 340 U. S. 367, 370--371 (1951); Vajtauer v. Commis-
sioner of Immi,gration, 273 U. S. 103, 112-113 (1927). 
These cases, taken together, "stand for the proposition that, I 
in the ordinary case, if a witness under compulsion to testify 
makes disclosures instead of claiming the privilege, the gov-
ernment has not 'compelled' him to incriminate himself." 
Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 654 (1976) (footnote 
omitted). Witnesses who failed to claim the privilege were 
once said to have "waived" it, but we have recently aban-
doned this "vague term,'V~ v. United States, 355 U.S. 
184, 191 (1957), and "made clear that an individual may lose 
the benefit of the privilege without making a knowing and 
intelligent waiver." ~ r v. United States, supra, at 654, 
n. 9. 
Although we have sometimes suggested in dicta that the 
usual rule might give way in situations where the govern-
ment has "substantial reason to believe that the requested 
disclosures are likely to be incriminating," Roberts v. United 
States, 445 U. S. 552, 559 (1980), we have never adopted the 
view that a witness must "put the Government on notice by 
formally availing himself of the privilege" only when he alone 
"is reasonably aware of the incriminating tendency of the 
questions." Id., at 562, n. * (BRENNAN, J. , concurring). It 
has long been recognized that "[t]he Constitution does not 
forbid the asking of criminative questions," United States v. 
Monia, supra, at 433 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), and noth-
ing in our prior cases suggests that the incriminating nature 
of a question, by itself, excuses a timely assertion of the priv-
ilege. See, e. g., United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S. 
564, 574-575 (1976) (plurality opinion). If a witness-even 
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tion that both he and the government should reasonably ex-
pect to incriminate him, the Court need ask only whether 
the particular disclosure was "compelled" within the meaning 
of the Fifth Amendment. 
United States v. Kordel, supra, perhaps the first case 
squarely to hold that a witness under compulsion to make dis-
closures must assert the privilege in a timely manner, is illus-
trative. In answering interrogatories submitted by the Gov-
ernment in a civil case against a corporation, a corporate 
officer who had been notified of contemplated criminal action 
against him supplied evidence and leads helpful in securing 
his indictment and conviction. Although the relationship be-
tween the civil and criminal actions was clear and "[ w ]ithout 
question [the officer] could have invoked his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege," 397 U. S., at 7, he did not do so. The Court 
concluded without hesitation that "[h]is failure at any time to 
assert the constitutional privilege leaves him in no position to 
complain now that he was compelled to give testimony 
against himself." Id., at 10 (footnote omitted). 
B 
Thus it is that a witness confronted with questions that the 
government should reasonably ex ect to elicit incriminating 
evidence ordinaril must assert the privilege ra er an an-
swer if he desires not to incrimma e 1mself. If he asserts 
the privilege, he "may not be reqmred to answer a question if 
there is some rational basis for believing that it will incrimi-
nate him, at least without at that time being assured that nei-
ther it nor its fruits may be used against him" in a subsequent 
criminal proceeding. Maness v. Myers, 419 U. S. 449, 473 
(1976) (WHITE, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). But if 
he chooses to answer, his choice is considered to be voluntary 
since he was free to claim the privilege and would suffer no 
penalty as the result of his decision to do so. As the Minne-
sota Supreme Court recognized, application of this general 
rule is inappropriate in certain well-defined situations. In 
-
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each of those situations, however, some identifiable factor 
"was held to deny the individual a 'free choice to admit, to 
deny, or to refuse to answer."' Garner v. United States, 
supra, at 657, quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 
241 (1941). Because we conclude that no such factor was 
present here, w~d that the plinnesota Supreme Court 
erred in excluding the probation officer's testimony. 
1 
A well-known exception to the general rule addresses the 
problem of confessions obtained from suspects in police cus-
tody. 6 Not only is custodial interrogation ordinarily con-
ducted by officers who are "acutely aware of the potentially 
incriminatory nature of the disclosures sought," ibid., but 
also the custodial setting is thought to contain "inherently 
compelling pressures which work to undermine the individ-
ual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would 
not otherwise do so freely." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 
at 467. See Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U. S. 218, 
246-247 (1973). To dissipate "the overbearing compulsion 
. . . caused by isolation of a suspect in police custody," 
United States v. Washington, 431 U. S. 181, 187, n. 5 (1977), 
the Miranda Court required the exclusion of incriminating 
statements obtained during custodial interrogation unless the 
suspect fails to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege after 
6 We emphasize that Murohy was not under arrest, and that he was free 
to leave at the end of the meeting. If he had been mtervi.ewed by his pro-
bat ioner officer while being held in police custody or by the police them-
selves in a custodial setting, the result would likely be different. In the 
former setting, it would be difficult to argue that the probation officer was 
not a law enforcement officer within the meaning of Miranda. Cf. Estelle 
v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454, 467 (1981); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778, 
785 (1973). In the latter, it would be difficult to distinguish the police 
questioning from the typical Miranda situation. See, e.g. , State v. 
Smith, 112 Ariz. 416, 420-421, 542 P. 2d 1115, 1119-1120 (1975); In re Mar-
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being suitably warned of his right to remain silent and of the 
consequences of his failure to assert it. 384 U. S., at 
467--469, 475-477. We have consistently held, however, that 
this extraordinary safeguard "does not apply outside the con-
text of the inherently coercive custodial interrogations for 
which it was designed." Robens v. United States, 445 
U. S., at 560. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that Murphy 
was not "in custody" when he made his incriminating admis-
sions. He was, to be sure, subject to a number of restrictive 
conditions governing various aspects of his life, and he would 
be regarded as "in custody'' for purposes of federal habeas 
corpus. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U. S. 236, 241-243 
(1963). But custody in that context has been defined broadly 
to effectuate the purposes of the writ, id., at 243; Hensley v. 
Municipal Court,, 411 U. S. 345, 349-851 (1973), and custody 
for Miranda purposes has been more narrowly circum-
scribed. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492 (1977) (per 
curiam). Under the narrower standard appropriate in the 
Miranda context, it is clear that Murphy w~ s not "in cus-
tody'' for purposes of receiving Miranda protection since 
£liere was no "'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of move-
ment' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Cali-
fornia v. Beheler, 463 U. S. --, -- (1983) (per curiam), 
quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, supra, at 495. 
Notwithstanding the inapplicability of Miranda, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court held that the probation officer"'srailure 
to ~ riilN~ Fif th Amena ment pr1v1lege barred 
use oflifs confessiomt1al. Four factors have been ad-
vanced in support of this conclusion, but we find them~ lone 
or in combination, insufficient to excuse Murphy's failure to 
clairn-tpe privilege in a timely manner. 
~ t, the probation officer could compel Murphy's atten-
dance and truthful answers. The Minnesota Supreme Court 
failed to explain how this transformed a routine interview 






subjected Murphy to less intimidating pressure than is im-
posed on grand jury witnesses, who are sworn to tell the 
truth and placed in a setting conducive to truthtelling. Al-
though warnings in both contexts might serve to dissipate 
"any possible coercion or unfairness resulting from a witness' 
misimpression that he must answer truthfully even questions 
with incriminating aspects," United States v. Washington, 
supra, at 188, we have never held that they must be given to 
grand jury witnesses, id., at 186, and we decline to require 
them here since the totality of the circumstances is not such 
as to overbear a probationer's free will. See Rogers v. Rich-
~~· 5 u. s. 534,544 (1961). 
1$e ond, he probation officer consciously sought incrimi-
ing:£ dence. We have already explained that this factor 
does not give rise to a self-executing privilege, ante, at--, 
and we pause here only to emphasize that police officers 
questioning persons suspected of crimes of ten consciously 
seek incriminating statements. The mere fact that an inves-
tigation has focused on a suspect does not trigger the need for 
Miranda warnings in noncustodial settings, Beckwith v. 
United States, 425 U. S. 341 (1976), and the probation offi-
cer's knowledge and intent have no bearing on the outcome of 
this,,e~ 
Thirg/Murphy did not expect questions about prior crimi-
nalconduct and could not seek counsel before attending the 
meeting. But th~ e of probation is such that probation-
ers should expect to be questioned on a wide range of topics 
relating to their past criminality. Moreover, the probation 
officer's letter, which suggested a need to discuss treatment 
from which Murphy had already been excused, would have 
led a reasonable probationer to conclude that new informa-
tion had come to her attention. In any event, Murphy's situ-
ation was in this regard indistinguishable from that facing 
suspects who are questioned in noncustodial settings and 
grand jury witnesses who are unaware of the scope of an in-
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See United States v. Washington, supra, at 188-189; 
Beckwith v. United States, supra, at 34~48. 
Fourth, there were no observers to guard against abuse or 
trickery. Again, this often will be true when a suspect is 
subjected to noncustodial interrogation, where no warnings 
are required. Murphy does not allege that the probation of-
ficer was not legitimately concerned with the need for further 
treatment, and we cannot conclude that her actions would 
have led a reasonable probationer to believe that his state-
ments to her would remain confidential. A probationer can-
not pretend ignorance of the fact that his probation officer "is 
a peace officer, and as such is allied, to a greater or lesser 
extent, with his fellow peace officers." Fare v. Michael C., 
442 U. S. 707, 720 (1979). See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 
U. S. 432, 447 (1982). Absent some express or implied 
promise to the contrary, he may also be charged with knowl-
edge that "the probation officer is duty bound to report 
wrongdoing by the [probationer] when it comes to his atten-
tion, even if by communication from the [probationer] him-
self." Fare v. Michael C., supra, at 720. The fact that 
Murphy apparently expressed no surprise on being informed 
that his statements would be made available to the police, 
moreover, strongly suggests that he was not misled by any 
expectation that his statements would remain confidential. 
See App. to Pet. for Cert. C21 (testimony of Mara Widseth); 
id., at C28 (testimony of Marshall Murphy). 
Even a cursory comparison of custodial interrogation and ] 
probation interviews r~ eals the inaptness of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court's analogy to Mfranda. Custodial arrest is 
sai to convey o t e s spect a message that he has no choice 
but to submit to the officers' will and to confess. Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U. S. , at 456-457. It is unlikely that a proba-
tion interview, arranged by appointment at a mutually conve-
nient time, would give rise to a similar impression. More-
over, custodial arrest thrusts an individual into "an 
unfamiliar atmosphere" or "an interrogation environment 
-
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... created for no purpose other than to subjugate the indi-
vidual to the will of his examiner." Id., at 457. Many of the 
psychological ploys discussed in Miranda capitalize on the 
suspect's unfamiliarity with the officers and the environment. 
Murphy's regular meetings with his probation officer should 
have served to familiarize him with her and her office and to 
insulate him from psychological intimidation that might over-
bear his desire to claim the privilege. Finally, the coercion 
inherent in custodial interrogation derives in large measure 
from an interrogator's insinuations that the interrogation will 
continue until a confession is obtained. Id., at 468. Since 
Murphy was not physically restrained and could have left the 
office, any compulsion he might have felt from the possibility 
that terminating the meeting would have led to revocation of 
probation was not comparable to the pressure on a suspect 
who is painfully aware that he literally cannot escape a 
persistent custodial interrogator. 7 
We conclude, therefore, that Murphy cannot cl_aim the ben- 1 
efit of the first exception to the general rule that the Fifth 
Amendment privilege is not self-executing. 
2 
The general rule that the privilege must be claimed when 
self-incrimination is threatened has also been deemed inappli-
cable in cases where the assertion of the privilege is penalized 
so as to "foreclos[e] a free choice to remain silent, and ... 
compe[l] ... incriminating testimony." Garner v. United 
States, 424 U. S., at 661. Because revocation of his proba-
tion was threatened if he refused to respond to the questions 
put to him by his probation officer, Murphy argues that he 
7 Neither the trial court nor the Minnesota Supreme Court found that 
Murphy believed that his probation could have been revoked for leaving 
the meeting or that he remained in the office for this reason. Since the 
meeting was scheduled at a mutually convenient time and was arranged 
pursuant to a request that did not include any threat, it is unlikely that 
Murphy believed that terminating the meeting would have jeopardized his 
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was compelled to make incriminating disclosures instead of 
claiming the privilege. Although this contention is not with-
out force, we find it unpersuasive on close examination. 
In each of the so-called "penalty" cases, the state not only ~ 
compelled an individual to appear and testify, but also sought 
to induce him to forego the Fifth Amendment privilege by 
threatening to impose economic or other sanctions "capable of 
forcing the self-incrimination which the Amendment forbids." 
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U. S. 801, 806 (1977). In 
most of the cases, the attempt to override the witness' privi-
lege proved unsuccessful, and the Court ruled that the state 
could not constitutionally make good on its prior threat. 
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S., at 79-84; Sanitation Men v. 
Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U. S. 280, 283-284 (1968); 
Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S. 273, 278-279 (1968). These 
cases make clear that "a State may not impose substantial 
penalties because a witness elects to exercise his Fifth 
Amendment right not to give incriminating testimony against 
himself." Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, supra, at 805. Occa-
sionally, however, an individual succumbed to the pressure 
placed upon him, failed to assert the privilege, and disclosed 
incriminating information, which the state later sought to use 
against him in a criminal prosecution. Garrity v. New J er-
sey, 385 U. S. 493 (1967), was such a case, and we held that 
an individual threatened with discharge from employment for 
exercising the privilege had not waived it by responding to 
questions rather than standing on his right to remain silent. 
Id. , at 498-499. 
The threat of punishment for reliance on the privilege 
distinguishes cases of this sort from the ordinary case in 
which a witness is merely required to appear and give testi-
mony. A state may require a probationer to appear and dis-
cuss matters that affect his probationary status; such a re-
quirement, without more, does not give rise to a 
self-executing privilege. The result may be different if the 
questions put to the probationer, however relevant to his 
-
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probationary status, call for answers that would incriminate 
him in a pending or later criminal prosecution. If the state, 
either expressly or by implication, asserts that invocation of 
the privilege would lead to revocation of probation, it would 
have created the classic penalty situation, the failure to as-
sert the privilege would be excused, and the probationer's 
answers would be deemed compelled and inadmissible in a 
criminal prosecution. 8 
8 The situation would be different if the questions put to a probationer 
were relevant to his probationary status and posed no realistic threat of 
incrimination in a separate criminal proceeding. If, for example, a resi-
dential restriction were imposed as a condition of probation, it would ap-
pear unlikely that a violation of that condition would be a criminal act. 
Hence, a claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege in response to questions 
relating to a residential condition could not validly rest on the ground that 
the answer might be used to incriminate if the probationer was tried for 
another crime. Neither, in our view, would the privilege be available on 
the ground that answering such questions might reveal a violation of the 
residential requirement and result in the termination of probation. Al-
though a revocation proceeding must comport with the requirements of 
due process, it is not a criminal proceeding. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 
U. S. 778, 782 (1973); United States v. Johnson, 455 F. 2d 932, 933 (CA5), 
cert. denied, 409 U. S. 856 (1972). Just as there is no right to a jury trial 
before probation may be revoked, neither is the privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination available to a probationer. It follows that 
whether or not the answer to a question about a residential requirement is 
compelled by the threat of revocation, there can be no valid claim of the 
privilege on the ground that the information sought can be used against 
him in revocation proceedings. 
As indicated in the text, it is otherwise if answering a valid question 
would reveal a criminal act or tend to incriminate in a separate criminal 
proceeding. Threatening revocation for refusing to answer such questions 
imposes a penalty for the exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege and is 
constitutionally impermissible. Our cases indicate, however, that a state 
may validly insist on answers to even incriminating questions and hence 
sensibly administer its probation system, as long as it recognizes that the 
required answers may not be used in a criminal proceeding and thus elimi-
nates the threat of incrimination. Under such circumstances, a probation-
er's "right to immunity as a result of his compelled testimony would not be 
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We must inquire, therefore, whether Murphy's probation 
conditions merely required him to appear and give testimony 
about matters relevant to his probationary status or whether 
they went farther and required him to choose between mak-
ing incriminating statements and jeopardizing his conditional 
liberty by remaining silent. Because we conclude that Min-
nesota did not attempt to take the extra, impermissible step, 
we hold that Murphy's Fifth Amendment privilege was not 
self-executing. 
As we have already indicated, Murphy was informed that 
he was required to be truthful with his probation officer in all 
matters and that failure to do so could result in revocation of 
probation. The opinion of the Minnesota Supreme Court 
made clear that this was indeed the case, but its conclusion 
that the probation officer's failure to give Murphy adequate 
warnings barred the use of his incriminating statements in 
the criminal trial did not rest on the ground that a refusal to 
furnish incriminating information would have justified revo-
cation of probation. Although the court recognized that im-
posing a penalty for a valid exercise of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege could impermissibly foreclose a free choice to re-
main silent, 324 N. W. 2d, at 342-343, it did not purport to 
find that Minnesota's probation revocation statute had such 
an effect. The court relied instead on the fact that Murphy 
was under legal compulsion to attend the meeting and to an-
swer truthfully the questions of a probation officer who antic-
ipated incriminating answers. Id. , at 344. Such compul-
sion, however, is indistinguishable from that felt by any 
witness who is required to appear and give testimony, and, 
as we have already made clear, it is insufficient to excuse 
Murphy's failure to exercise the privilege in a timely manner. 
The State court did not attempt to define the precise con- I}') 
tours of Murphy's obligation to respond to questions. On its /j 
284-285 (1968). See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U. S. 801, 805--806 
(1977); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S. 70, 84-85 (1973); Gardner v. 
Broderick, 392 U. S. 273, 278 (1968). 
-
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face, Murphy's probation condition proscribed only false 
statements; it said nothing about his freedom to decline to an-
swer particular questions and certainly contained no sugges-
tion that his probation was conditional on his waiving his 
Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to further criminal 
prosecution. "At this point in our history virtually every 
schoolboy is familiar with the concept, if not the language, of 
the [Fifth Amendment]." Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 
433, 439 (1974). Yet Murphy, although he had a right to do 
so, see State v. Austin, 295 N. W. 2d 246 (Minn. 1980), did 
not seek clarification of the condition. Without the benefit of 
an authoritative state-court construction of the condition, we 
are hesitant to read into the truthfulness requirement an ad-
ditional obligation that Murphy refrain from raising legiti-
mate objections to furnishing information that might lead to 
his conviction for another crime. -
Whether we employ a subjective or an objective test, there I 
is no reasonable basis for concluding that Minnesota at-
tempted to attach an impermissible penalty to the exercise of 
the privilege against self-incrimination. There is no direct 
evidence that Murphy confessed because he feared that his 
probation would be revoked. Unlike the police officers in 
Garrity v. New Jersey , supra, Murphy was not expressly in-
formed during the crucial meeting with his probation officer 
that an assertion of the privilege would result in the imposi-
tion of a penalty. And the fact that Murphy apparently felt 
no compunction about adamantly denying the false imprison-
ment charge on which he had been convicted before admit-
ting to the rape and murder strongly suggests that the 
"threat'" of revocation did not overwhelm his resistance. 
If Murphy did harbor a belief that his probation might be / 
revoked for exercising the Fifth Amendment privilege, that 
belief would not have been reasonable. Our decisions have 
ma e clear that the State could no constitutionally carry out 
a threat to revoke probation for the legitimate exercise of the 
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neither the State court nor any State officer has suggested 
otherwise. Indeed, in its brief in this Court, the State sub-
mits that it would not, and legally could not, revoke proba-
tion for refusing to answer questions calling for information 
that would incriminate in separate criminal proceedings. 
Brief for Petitioner 3(h39, and n. 7. See also Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 7-8, 10-14. 
Minnesota's revocation statute, which was accurately sum-
marized in Murphy's notice of probation, see App. to Pet. for 
Cert. C3~C34, authorizes revocation "[ w ]hen it appears that 
the defendant has violated any of the conditions of his proba-
tion or has otherwise been guilty of misconduct which war-
rants the imposing or execution of sentence." Minn. Stat. 
§ 609.14 (1982). Revocation is not automatic under this pro-
vis10n. Even- if the probation officer desires revocation, a 
probationer must be afforded a hearing, Pearson v. State, 
308 Minn. 287, 289-290, 241 N. W. 2d 490, 492-493 (1976); 
State ex rel. Halverson v. Young, 278 Minn. 381, 38(h387, 
154 N. W. 2d 699, 702-703 (1967), and the court must find 
that he violated a specific condition, that the violation was in-
tentional or inexcusable, and that the need for confinement 
outweighs the policies favoring probation. State v. Austin, 
supra, at 250. We have not been advised of any case in 
which Minnesota has attempted to revoke probation merely 
because a probationer refused to make nonimmunized disclo-
sures concerning his own criminal conduct; and, in light of our 
decisions proscribing threats of penalties for the exercise of 
Fifth Amendment rights, Murphy could not reasonably have 
feared that the assertion of the privilege would have led to 
revocation. , 
Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Murphy was de-
terred from claiming the privilege by a reasonably perceived 
threat of revocation. 
3 
A third exception to the general requirement of a timely 
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to the penalty exception, has been developed in the context of 
the federal occupational and excise taxes on gamblers. In 
recognition of the pervasive criminal regulation of gambling 
activities and the fact that cia1miiig ffie priviiege in lieu of fil-
ing a return would tend to incriminate, the Court has held 
that the privilege may be exercised by failing to file. 
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U. S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. 
United States, 390 U. S. 62 (1968). See also Mackey v. 
United States, 401 U. S. 667 (1971). 
"[M]aking a claim of privilege when the disclosures were 
requested, i. e., when the returns were due, would have 
identified the claimant as a gambler. The Court there-
fore forgave the usual requirement that the claim of 
privilege be presented for evaluation in favor of a 'claim' 
by silence. . . . If a particular gambler would not have 
incriminated himself by filing the tax returns, the privi-
lege would not justify a failure to file." Garner v. 
United States, 424 U. S., at 658-659, n. 11. 
But, while a taxpayer who claims the privilege instead of fil-
ing gambling tax returns necessarily identifies himself as a 
gambler, a probationer confronted with incriminating ques-
tions ordinarily will have no problem effectively claiming the 
privilege at the time disclosures are requested. There ex-
ists, therefore, no reason to forgive the requirement that the 
claim be presented for evaluation in a timely manner. 9 
9 Nothing in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971), requires a 
different conclusion. In that case, which arose before the Court recog-
nized a privilege not to file gambling tax returns, the taxpayer filed a re-
turn that was introduced as evidence in a criminal prosecution for income 
tax evasion. A majority of the Court considered the disclosures to have 
been compelled incriminations, id., at 672 (plurality opinion); id. , at 
704-705 (BRENNAN, J. , concurring in judgment); id., at 713 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting), but the taxpayer was not immunized against their use because 
Marchetti and Grosso were not given retroactive effect. Id. , at 674-675 
(plurality opinion); id., at 700-701 (Harlan, J ., concurring in judgment). 
Even assuming that the taxpayer's disclosures would have been excluded if 
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We conclude, in summary, that since Murphy revealed in-
criminating information instead of timely asserting his Fifth 
Amendment privilege, his disclosures were not compelled in-
criminations. Because he was not compelled to incriminate 
himself, Murphy could not successfully invoke the privilege 
to prevent the information he volunteered to his probation of-
ficer from being used against him in a criminal prosecution. 
The judgment is 
Reversed. 
( 
necessarily that a taxpayer would be immunized against use of disclosures 
made on gambling tax returns when the Fifth Amendment would have jus-
tified a failure to file at all." Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 659, 
n. 13 (1976). In other words, a taxpayer making incriminating disclosures 
on a return filed after Marchetti and Grosso could not necessarily prevent 
the use of those disclosures in a criminal prosecution because he had been 
afforded an effective way to assert the privilege. Respondent Murphy's 
situation, we believe, is analogous to that of the post-Marchetti taxpayer: 
since he could have asserted the privilege effectively but failed to do so, his 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-827 
MINNESOTA, PETITIONER v. MARSHALL 
DONALD MURPHY 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF MINNESOTA 
[November -, 1983) 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case, respondent Murphy, who was on probation, 
made incriminating admissions during a meeting with his pro-
bation officer. The issue before us is whether the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the introduction into evi-
dence of the admissions in Murphy's subsequent criminal 
prosecution. 
I 
In 1974, Marshall Murphy was twice questioned by Minne-
apolis Police concerning the rape and murder of a teenage 
girl. No charges were then brought. In 1980, in connection 
with a prosecution for criminal sexual conduct arising out of 
an unrelated incident, Murphy pleaded guilty to a reduced 
charge of false imprisonment. He was sentenced to a prison 
term of sixteen months, which was suspended, and three 
years' probation. The terms of Murphy's probation re-
quired, among other things, that he participate in a treat-
ment program for sexual offenders at Alpha House, report to 
his probation officer as directed, and be truthful with the pro-
bation officer "in all matters." Failure to comply with these 
conditions, Murphy was informed, could result in his return 
to the sentencing court for a probation revocation hearing. 
App. to Pet. for Cert. C33-C35. 
Murphy met with his probation officer at her office ap-
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out incident until July 1981, when the officer learned that he 
had abandoned the treatment program. The probation offi-
cer then wrote to Murphy and informed him that failure to 
set up a meeting would "result in an immediate request for a 
warrant." Id., at C35. At a meeting in late July, the offi-
cer agreed not to seek revocation of probation for nonpartici-
pation in the treatment program since Murphy was employed 
and doing well in other areas. 
In September 1981, an Alpha House counselor informed 
the probation officer that, during the course of treatment, 
Murphy had admitted to a rape and murder in 1974. After 
discussions with her superior, the officer determined that the 
police should have this information. 1 She then wrote to 
Murphy and asked him to contact her to discuss a treatment 
plan for the remainder of his probationary period. 2 Al-
though she did not contact the police before the meeting, the 
probation officer knew in advance that she would report any 
incriminating statements. 
Upon receipt of the letter, Murphy arranged to meet with 
his probation officer in her office on September 28, 1981. 
The officer opened the meeting by telling Murphy about the 
1 The parties stipulated in the trial court that Alpha House was covered 
by federal statutes providing for the confidentiality of patient records in 
federally assisted drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs, 21 U. S. C. 
§ 1175 and 42 U. S. C. § 4582, and the regulations adopted pursuant 
thereto, 42 CFR pt. 2 (1982). Although the Alpha House counselor legiti-
mately informed respondent's probation officer of his incriminating admis-
sions, we assume, without deciding, that the counselor could not have pro-
vided the information to the police. See id., at§§ 2.39(a), 2.63; Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 6. We assume, as well, that the probation officer could not have 
made the counselor's information available for use in a criminal prosecu-
tion. See id., at § 2.39(d); Tr. of Oral Arg. 6-7. 
2 It is unclear whether the probation officer could have ordered Murphy 
to pursue additional treatment as a condition of probation. App. to Pet. 
for Cert. C14 (testimony of Mara Widseth). But there is no evidence that 
she used treatment as a subterfuge or that her sole purpose was to obtain 
incriminating statements for the police. Under our view of the case, such 
a purpose would not change the result. Post, at --. 
-
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information she had received from the Alpha House counselor 
and expressing her belief that this information evinced his 
continued need for treatment. Murphy became angry about 
what he considered to be a breach of his confidences and 
stated that he "felt like calling a lawyer." 3 The probation 
officer replied that Murphy would have to deal with that 
problem outside the office; for the moment, their primary 
concern was the relationship between the crimes that Mur-
phy had admitted to the Alpha House counselor and the inci-
dent that led to his conviction for false imprisonment. 
During the course of the meeting, Murphy denied the false 
imprisonment charge, admitted that he had committed the 
rape and murder, and attempted to persuade the probation 
officer that further treatment was unnecessary because sev-
eral extenuating circumstances explained the prior crimes. 
At the conclusion of the meeting, the officer told Murphy that 
she had a duty to relay the information to the authorities and 
encouraged him to turn himself in. Murphy then left the of-
fice. Two days later, Murphy called his probation officer 
and told her that he had been advised by counsel not to sur-
render himself to the police. The officer then procured the 
issuance of an arrest and detention order from the judge who 
8 The trial court concluded that Murphy's statement did not constitute 
an invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination: "[W]hatever his 
real intent may have been, we are persuaded by the probation officer's tes-
timony that he did not express [the] desire [to talk to an attorney] in any 
context other than a civil suit for the breach of confidentiality." App. to 
Pet. for Cert. B13-B14. The Minnesota Supreme Court did not reach this 
question, and, although we see no reason to question the trial court's fac-
tual finding, our analysis of the case makes further consideration unnec-
essary. Although a request for a lawyer during custodial interrogation is 
sufficient to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination, Fare v. Mi-
chael C., 442 U. S. 707, 709 (1979), Murphy was not in custody, post, at 
--, and he had no federal right to have an attorney present at the meet-
ing. See United States v. Rea, 678 F. 2d 382, 390 (CA2 1982); People v. 
Ronald W., 31 App. Div. 2d 163, 165, 295 N. Y. S. 2d 767, 769 (1968), aff'd, 
24 N. Y. 2d 732, 249 N. E. 2d 882, 302 N. Y. S. 2d 260 (1969); Hughes v. 
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had sentenced Murphy on the false imprisonment charge. 
On October 29, 1981, a State grand jury returned an indict-
ment charging Murphy with first-degree murder. 
Murphy sought to suppress testimony concerning his con-
fession on the ground that it was obtained in violation of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court found 
that he was not "in custody'' at the time of the statement and 
that the confession was neither compelled nor involuntary de-
spite the absence of warnings similar to those required by 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). The Minnesota 
Supreme Court reversed on federal constitutional grounds. 
Although recognizing that the Fifth Amendment privilege 
generally is not self-executing, it concluded that, notwith-
standing the lack of custody in the usual sense, Murphy's fail-
ure to claim the privilege when he was questioned was not 
fatal to his claim "[b]ecause of the compulsory nature of the 
meeting, because [Murphy] was under court order to respond 
truthfully to his agent's questions, and because the agent had 
substantial reason to believe that [Murphy's] answers were 
likely to be incriminating." 324 N. W. 2d 340, 344 (Minn. 
1982). In the court's view, "the agent should have warned 
[Murphy] of his privilege against self-incrimination before 
she questioned him and . . . her failure to do so, when she 
had already decided to report his answers to the police, bars 
use of [Murphy's] confession at this trial." Ibid. 
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among state and 
federal courts concerning whether a statement made by a 
probationer to his probation officer without prior warnings is 
admissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding, 459 U. S. 
-- (1983). 4 We now reverse. 
•Compare, e.g., United States v. Steele, 419 F . Supp. 1385, 1386--1387 
(W. D. Pa. 1976); People v. Garcia, 240 Cal. App. 2d 9, 12-13, 49 Cal. 
Rptr. 146, 148 (1966); and State v. Lekas, 201 Kan. 579, 582-584, 442 P. 2d 
11, 15-16 (1968), with, e. g., United States v. Miller, 643 F. 2d 713, 715 
(CAlO 1981); United States v. Holmes, 594 F . 2d 1167 (CA8), cert. denied , 
444 U. S. 873 (1979); Nettles v. State, 248 So. 2d 259, 260 (Fla. App. 1971); 
-
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The Fifth Amendment, in relevant part, provides that no 
person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself." It has long been held that this prohi-
bition not only permits a person to refuse to testify against 
himself at a criminal trial in which he is a defendant, but also 
"privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in 
any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, 
where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal 
proceedings." Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S. 70, 77 (1973). 
In all such proceedings, 
"a witness protected by the privilege may rightfully 
refuse to answer unless and until he is protected at least 
against the use of his compelled answers and evidence 
derived therefrom in any subsequent criminal case in 
which he is a defendant. . . . Absent such protection, if 
he is nevertheless compelled to answer, his answers are 
inadmissible against him in a later criminal prosecution." 
Id., at 78. 
A defendant does not lose this protection by reason of his con-
viction of a crime; notwithstanding that a defendant is impris-
oned or on probation at the time he makes incriminating 
statements, if those statements are compelled they are inad-
missible in a subsequent trial for a crime other than that for 
which he has been convicted. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 
425 U. S. 308, 316 (1976). 5 The issue in this case is whether 
Connell v. State, 131 Ga. App. 213, 205 S. E. 2d 513, 514 (1974); State v. 
Hart,man, 281 N. W. 2d 639, 643-644 (Iowa App. 1979); and People v. 
Parker, 101 Misc. 2d 800, 802-804, 421 N. Y. S. 2d 561, 562-563 (1979). 
5 Although probation is a privilege that offenders may not necessarily 
demand as a constitutional right, Burns v. United States, 287 U. S. 216, 
220 (1932), probationers should not be deemed to have forfeited their Fifth 
Amendment right to refrain from providing evidence that could be used 
against them in subsequent criminal proceedings in exchange for the sen-
tencing authority's "act of grace." The "act of grace" theory has been 
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the Fifth Amendment right that Murphy enjoyed was vio-
lated by the admission into evidence at his trial for another 
crime of the prior statements made by him to his probation 
officer. 
A 
We note first that the general obligation to appear and an-
swer questions truthfully did not in itself convert Murphy's 
otherwise voluntary statements into compelled ones. In 
that respect, Murphy was in no better position than the ordi-
nary witness at a trial or before a grand jury who is subpoe-
naed and sworn to tell the truth and is obligated to answer on 
the pain of contempt, unless he invokes the privilege and 
shows that he faces a realistic threat of incriminating himself. 
The answers of such a witness to questions put to him are not 
compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment unless 
the witness is required to answer over his valid claim of the 
privilege. This much is reasonably clear from our cases. 
As this Court has long acknowledged, 
"[t]he [Fifth] Amendment speaks of compulsion. It 
does not preclude a witness from testifying voluntarily in 
matters which may incriminate him. If, therefore, he 
desires the protection of the privilege, he must claim it 
or he will not be considered to have been 'compelled' 
(1969), and since our decisions in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471 
(1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli , 411 U. S. 778 (1973), the theory has lost 
whatever vitality it once might have had. See id., at 782, n. 4. The once-
popular "contract" theory of probation, under which the agreement to 
abide by various conditions was characterized as consideration for an offer 
of exemption from imprisonment, is also incapable of supporting the con-
clusion that an offender who has accepted an offer of probation has thereby 
waived his Fifth Amendment privilege in toto. The contract analogy is 
faulty since "[t]he law of contract is posited upon the notion of an equality 
of bargaining position between parties which culminates in a voluntary 
agreement. However, defendants are not in a position to bargain with a 
court because virtually any condition is preferable to jail." Best & Birzon, 
Conditions of Probation: An Analysis, 51 Geo. L. J. 809, 832--833 (1963). 
Like the "act of grace" theory, the "contract" theory was deprived of force 
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within the meaning of the Amendment." United States 
v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424, 427 (1943) (footnote omitted). 
This principle has been applied in cases involving a variety of 
criminal and noncriminal investigations. See, e.g., United 
States v. Kordel, 397 U. S. 1, 7-10 (1970); Rogers v. United 
States, 340 U. S. 367, 370-371 (1951); Vajtauer v. Commis-
sioner of Immigration, 273 U. S. 103, 112-113 (1927). 
These cases, taken together, "stand for the proposition that, 
in the ordinary case, if a witness under compulsion to testify 
makes disclosures instead of claiming the privilege, the gov-
ernment has not 'compelled' him to incriminate himself." 
Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 654 (1976) (footnote 
omitted). Witnesses who failed to claim the privilege were 
once said to have "waived" it, but we have recently aban-
doned this "vague term," Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 
184, 191 (1957), and "made clear that an individual may lose 
the benefit of the privilege without making a knowing and 
intelligent waiver." Garner v. United States, supra, at 654, 
n. 9. 
Although we have sometimes suggested in dicta that the 
usual rule might give way in situations where the govern-
ment has "substantial reason to believe that the requested 
disclosures are likely to be incriminating," Roberts v. United 
States, 445 U. S. 552, 559 (1980), we have never adopted the 
view that a witness must "put the Government on notice by 
formally availing himself of the privilege" only when he alone 
"is reasonably aware of the incriminating tendency of the 
questions." Id., at 562, n. * (BRENNAN, J., concurring). It 
has long been recognized that "[t]he Constitution does not 
forbid the asking of criminative questions," United States v. 
Monia, supra, at 433 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), and noth-
ing in our prior cases suggests that the incriminating nature 
of a question, by itself, excuses a timely assertion of the priv-
ilege. See, e.g., United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S. 
564, 574-575 (1976) (plurality opinion). If a witness-even 
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tion that both he and the government should reasonably ex-
pect to incriminate him, the Court need ask only whether 
the particular disclosure was "compelled" within the meaning 
of the Fifth Amendment. 
United States v. Kordel, supra, perhaps the first case 
squarely to hold that a witness under compulsion to make dis-
closures must assert the privilege in a timely manner, is illus-
trative. In answering interrogatories submitted by the Gov-
ernment in a civil case against a corporation, a corporate 
officer who had been notified of contemplated criminal action 
against him supplied evidence and leads helpful in securing 
his indictment and conviction. Although the relationship be-
tween the civil and criminal actions was clear and "[ w ]ithout 
question [the officer] could have invoked his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege," 397 U. S., at 7, he did not do so. The Court 
concluded without hesitation that "[h]is failure at any time to 
assert the constitutional privilege leaves him in no position to 
complain now that he was compelled to give testimony 
against himself." Id., at 10 (footnote omitted). 
B 
Thus it is that a witness confronted with questions that the 
government ·should reasonably expect to elicit incriminating 
evidence ordinarily must assert the privilege rather than an-
swer if he desires not to incriminate himself. If he asserts 
the privilege, he "may not be required to answer a question if 
there is some rational basis for believing that it will incrimi-
nate him, at least without at that time being assured that nei-
ther it nor its fruits may be used against him" in a subsequent 
criminal proceeding. Maness v. Myers, 419 U. S. 449, 473 
(1976) (WHITE, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). But if 
he chooses to answer, his choice is considered to be voluntary 
since he was free to claim the privilege and would suffer no 
penalty as the result of his decision to do so. As the Minne-
sota Supreme Court recognized, application of this general 
rule is inappropriate in certain well-defined situations. In 
-
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each of those situations, however, some identifiable factor 
"was held to deny the individual a 'free choice to admit, to 
deny, or to refuse to answer."' Garner v. United States, 
supra, at 657, quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 
241 (1941). Because we conclude that no such factor was 
present here, we hold that the Minnesota Supreme Court 
erred in excluding the probation officer's testimony. 
1 
A well-known exc~tion to the general rule addresses the 
problem of confessions obtained from suspects in police cus-
tody. 6 Not only is custodial mterrogation ordinarily- con-
ducted by officers who are "acutely aware of the potentially 
incriminatory nature of the disclosures sought," ibid., but 
also the custodial setting is thought to contain "inherently 
compelling pressures which work to undermine the individ-
ual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would 
not otherwise do so freely." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 
at 467. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 
246-247 (1973). To dissipate "the overbearing compulsion 
. . . caused by isolation of a suspect in police custody," 
United States v. Washington, 431 U. S. 181, 187, n. 5 (1977), 
the Miranda Court required the exclusion of incriminating 
statements obtained during custodial interrogation unless the 
suspect fails to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege after 
•We emphasize that Murohy was not under arrest, and that he was free 
to leave at the end of the meeting. If he fiad been interviewed by his pro-
bationer officer while being held in police custody or by the police them-
selves in a custodial setting, the result would likely be different. In the 
former setting, it would be difficult to argue that the probation officer was 
not a law enforcement officer within the meaning of Miranda. Cf. Estelle 
v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454, 467 (1981); Gagnon v. Scarpelli , 411 U. S. 778, 
785 (1973). In the latter, it would be difficult to distinguish the police 
questioning from the typical Miranda situation. See, e. g. , State v. 
Smith, 112 Ariz. 416, 420-421, 542 P. 2d 1115, 111~1120 (1975); In re Mar-
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being suitably warned of his right to remain silent and of the 
consequences of his failure to assert it. 384 U • S., at l 
467-469, 475-477. We have consistently held, however, that 
this extraordinary safeguard "does not apply outside the con-
text of the inherently coercive custodial interrogations for 
which it was designed." Roberts v. United States, 445 
U. S., at 560. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that Murphy 
was not "in custody'' when he made his incriminating admis-
sions. He was, to be sure, subject to a number of restrictive 
conditions governing various aspects of his life, and he would 
be regarded as "in custody'' for purposes of federal habeas 
corpus. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U. S. 236, 241-243 
(1963). But custody in that context has been defined broadly 
to effectuate the purposes of the writ, id., at 243; Hensley v. 
Municipal Court, 411 U. S. 345, 349-351 (1973), and custody 
for Miranda purposes has been more narrowly circum-
scribed. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492 (1977) (per 
curiam). Under the narrower standard appropriate in the 
Miranda context, it is clear that Murphy was not "in_cus-
tody" for purposes of receiving Miranda protection since 
tnere was no " 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of move-
ment' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Cali-
fornia v. Beheler, 463 U. S. --, -- (1983) (per curiam), 
quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, supra, at 495. 
Notwithstanding the inapplicability of Miranda, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court held that the probation officer's failure 
to inform Murphy of the Fifth Amendment privilege barred 
use of his confession at trial. Four factors have been ad- 1 
vanced in support of this conclusion, but we find them, alone 
or in combination, insufficient to excuse Murphy's failure to 
claim the privilege in a timely manner. 
First, the probation officer could compel Murphy's atten-
dance and truthful answers. The Minnesota Supreme Court 
failed to explain how this transformed a routine interview 
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subjected Murphy to less intimidating pressure than is im-
posed on grand jury witnesses, who are sworn to tell the 
truth and placed in a setting conducive to truthtelling. Al-
though warnings in both contexts might serve to dissipate 
"any possible coercion or unfairness resulting from a witness' 
misimpression that he must answer truthfully even questions 
with incriminating aspects," United States v. Washington, 
supra, at 188, we have never held that they must be given to 
grand jury witnesses, id., at 186, and we decline to require 
them here since the totality of the circumstances is not such 
as to overbear a probationer's free will. See Rogers v. Rich-
mond, 365 U. S. 534, 544 (1961). 
Second, the probation officer consciously sought incrimi-
nating evidence. We have already explained that this factor 
does not give rise to a self-executing privilege, ante, at - -, 
and we pause here only to emphasize that police officers 
questioning persons suspected of crimes of ten consciously 
seek incriminating statements. The mere fact that an inves-
tigation has focused on a suspect does not trigger the need for 
Miranda warnings in noncustodial settings, Beckwith v. 
United States, 425 U. S. 341 (1976), and the probation offi-
cer's knowledge and intent have no bearing on the outcome of 
this case. 
Third, Murphy did not expect questions about prior crimi-
nal conduct and could not seek counsel before attending the 
meeting. But the nature of probation is such that probation-
ers should expect to be questioned on a wide range of topics 
relating to their past criminality. Moreover, the probation 
officer's letter, which suggested a need to discuss treatment 
from which Murphy had already been excused, would have 
led a reasonable probationer to conclude that new informa-
tion had come to her attention. In any event, Murphy's situ-
ation was in this regard indistinguishable from that facing 
suspects who are questioned in noncustodial settings and 
grand jury witnesses who are unaware of the scope of an in-
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See United States v. Washington, supra, at 188-189; 
Beckwith v. United States, supra, at 346--348. 
Fourth, there were no observers to guard against abuse or 
trickery. Again, this often will be true when a suspect is 
subjected to noncustodial interrogation, where no warnings 
are required. Murphy does not allege that the probation of-
ficer was not legitimately concerned with the need for further 
treatment, and we cannot conclude that her actions would 
have led a reasonable probationer to believe that his state-
ments to her would remain confidential. A probationer can-
not pretend ignorance of the fact that his probation officer "is 
a peace officer, and as such is allied, to a greater or lesser 
extent, with his fellow peace officers." Fare v. Michael C., 
442 U. S. 707, 720 (1979). See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 
U. S. 432, 447 (1982). Absent some express or implied 
promise to the contrary, he may also be charged with knowl-
edge that "the probation officer is duty bound to report 
wrongdoing by the [probationer] when it comes to his atten-
tion, even if by communication from the [probationer] him-
self." Fare v. Michael C., supra, at 720. The fact that 
Murphy apparently expressed no surprise on being informed 
that his statements would be made available to the police, 
moreover, strongly suggests that he was not misled by any 
expectation that his statements would remain confidential. 
See App. to Pet. for Cert. C21 (testimony of Mara Widseth); 
id., at C28 (testimony of Marshall Murphy). 
Even a cursory comparison of custodial interrogation and 
probation interviews reveals the inaptness of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court's analogy to Miranda. Custodial arrest is 
said to convey to the suspect a message that he has no choice 
but to submit to the officers' will and to confess. Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U. S., at 456-457. It is unlikely that a proba-
tion interview, arranged by appointment at a mutually conve-
nient time, would give rise to a similar impression. More-
over, custodial arrest thrusts an individual into "an 
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... created for no purpose other than to subjugate the indi-
vidual to the will of his examiner." Id., at 457. Many of the 
psychological ploys discussed in Miranda capitalize on the 
suspect's unfamiliarity with the officers and the environment. 
Murphy's regular meetings with his probation officer should 
have served to familiarize him with her and her office and to 
insulate him from psychological intimidation that might over-
bear his desire to claim the privilege. Finally, the coercion 
inherent in custodial interrogation derives in large measure 
from an interrogator's insinuations that the interrogation will 
continue until a confession is obtained. Id., at 468. Since 
Murphy was not physically restrained and could have left the 
office, any compulsion he might have felt from the possibility 
that terminating the meeting would have led to revocation of 
probation was not comparable to the pressure on a suspect 
who is painfully aware that he literally cannot escape a 
persistent custodial interrogator. 7 ( 
We conclude, therefore, that Murphy cannot claim the ben-
efit of the first exception to the general rule that the Fifth 
Amendment privilege is not self-executing. 
2 
The general rule that the privilege must be claimed when 
self-incrimination is threatened has also been deemed inappli-
cable in cases where the assertion of the privilege is penalized 
so as to "foreclos[e] a free choice to remain silent, and ... 
compe[l] ... incriminating testimony." Garner v. United 
States, 424 U. S., at 661. Because revocation of his proba-
tion was threatened if he refused to respond to the questions 
put to him by his probation officer, Murphy argues that he 
7 Neither the trial court nor the Minnesota Supreme Court found that 
Murphy believed that his probation could have been revoked for leaving 
the meeting or that he remained in the office for this reason. Since the 
meeting was scheduled at a mutually convenient time and was arranged 
pursuant to a request that did not include any threat, it is unlikely that 
Murphy believed that terminating the meeting would have jeopardized his 
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was compelled to make incriminating disclosures instead of 
claiming the privilege. Although this contention is not with-
out force, we find it unpersuasive on close examination. 
In each of the so-called "penalty" cases, the state not only 
compelled an individual to appear and testify, but also sought 
to induce him to forego the Fifth Amendment privilege by 
threatening to impose economic or other sanctions "capable of 
forcing the self-incrimination which the Amendment forbids." 
Lefkouritz v. Cunningham, 431 U. S. 801, 806 (1977). In 
most of the cases, the attempt to override the witness' privi-
lege proved unsuccessful, and the Court ruled that the state 
could not constitutionally make good on its prior threat. 
Lefkouritz v. Turley, 414 U. S., at 79-84; Sanitation Men v. 
Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U. S. 280, 283-284 (1968); 
Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S. 273, 278-279 (1968). These 
cases make clear that "a State may not impose substantial 
penalties because a witness elects to exercise his Fifth 
Amendment right not to give incriminating testimony against 
himself." Lefkouritz v. Cunningham, supra, at 805. Occa-
sionally, however, an individual succumbed to the pressure 
placed upon him, failed to assert the privilege, and disclosed 
incriminating information, which the state later sought to use 
against him in a criminal prosecution. Garrity v. New Jer-
sey, 385 U. S. 493 (1967), was such a case, and we held that 
an individual threatened with discharge from employment for 
exercising the privilege had not waived it by responding to 
questions rather than standing on his right to remain silent. 
. Id., at 498-499. 
The threat of punishment for reliance on the privilege 
distinguishes cases of this sort from the ordinary case in 
which a witness is merely required to appear and give testi-
mony. A state may require a probationer to appear and dis-
cuss matters that affect his probationary status; such a re-
quirement, without more, does not give rise to a 
self-executing privilege. The result may be different if the 
questions put to the probationer, however relevant to his 
-
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probationary status, call for answers that would incriminate 
him in a pending or later criminal prosecution. If the state, 
either expressly or by implication, asserts that invocation of 
the privilege would. lead to revocation of probation, it would 
have created the classic penalty situation, the failure to as-
sert the privilege would be excused, and the probationer's 
answers would be deemed compelled and inadmissible in a 
criminal prosecution. 8 
8 The situation would be different if the questions put to a probationer 
were relevant to his probationary status and posed no realistic threat of 
incrimination in a separate criminal proceeding. If, for example, a resi-
dential restriction were imposed as a condition of probation, it would ap-
pear unlikely that a violation of that condition would be a criminal act. 
Hence, a claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege in response to questions 
relating to a residential condition could not validly rest on the ground that 
the answer might be used to incriminate if the probationer was tried for 
another crime. Neither, in our view, would the privilege be available on 
the ground that answering such questions might reveal a violation of the 
residential requirement and result in the termination of probation. Al-
though a revocation proceeding must comport with the requirements of 
due process, it is not a criminal proceeding. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 
U. S. 778, 782 (1973); United States v. Johnson, 455 F. 2d 932, 933 (CA5), 
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 856 (1972). Just as there is no right to a jury trial 
before probation may be revoked, neither is the privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination available to a probationer. It follows that 
whether or not the answer to a question about a residential requirement is 
compelled by the threat of revocation, there can be no valid claim of the 
privilege on the ground that the information sought can be used against 
him in revocation proceedings. 
As indicated in the text, it is otherwise if answering a valid question 
would reveal a criminal act or tend to incriminate in a separate criminal 
proceeding. Threatening revocation for refusing to answer such questions 
imposes a penalty for the exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege and is 
constitutionally impermissible. Our cases indicate, however, that a state 
may validly insist on answers to even incriminating questions and hence 
sensibly administer its probation system, as long as it recognizes that the 
required answers may not be used in a criminal proceeding and thus elimi-
nates the threat of incrimination. Under such circumstances, a probation-
er's "right to immunity as a result of his compelled testimony would not be 
at stake." Sanitation Men v. Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U. S. 280, 
5~ 
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We must inquire, therefore, whether Murphy's probation 
conditions merely required him to appear and give testimony 
about matters relevant to his probationary status or whether 
they went farther and required him to choose between mak-
ing incriminating statements and jeopardizing his conditional 
liberty by remaining silent. Because we conclude that Min-
nesota did not attempt to take the extra, impermissible step, 
we hold that Murphy's Fifth Amendment privilege was not 
self-executing. 
As we have already indicated, Murphy was informed that 
he was required to be truthful with his probation officer in all 
matters and that failure to do so could result in revocation of 
probation. The opinion of the Minnesota Supreme Court 
made clear that this was indeed the case, but its conclusion 
that the probation officer's failure to give Murphy adequate 
warnings barred the use of his incriminating statements in 
the criminal trial did not rest on the ground that a refusal to 
furnish incriminating information would have justified revo-
cation of probation. Although the court recognized that im-
posing a penalty for a valid exercise of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege could impermissibly foreclose a free choice to re-
main silent, 324 N. W. 2d, at 342--343, it did not purport to 
find that Minnesota's probation revocation statute had such 
an effect. The court relied instead on the fact that Murphy 
was under legal compulsion to attend the meeting and to an-
swer truthfully the questions of a probation officer who antic- I 
ipated incriminating answers. Id., at 344. Such compul-
sion, however, is indistinguishable from that felt by any 
witness who is requii'ea' o appear an gwe es 1mony, and, 
as e ave a re ma e c ear, · · msu c1ent to excuse 
Murphy's failure to exercise the privilege in a timely manner. 
The State court did not attempt to define the precise con-
tours of Murphy's obligation to respond to questions. On its 
284-285 (1968). See Lefkoivitz v. Cunningham, 431 U. S. 801, 805--806 
(1977); Lefkoivitz v. Turley, 414 U. S. 70, 84--85 (1973); Gardner v. 
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face, Murphy's probation condition proscribed only false 
statements; it said nothing about his freedom to decline to an-
swer particular questions and certainly contained no sugges-
tion that his probation was conditional on his waiving his 
Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to further criminal 
prosecution. "At this point in our history virtually every 
schoolboy is familiar with the concept, if not the language, of 
the [Fifth Amendment]." Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 
433, 439 (1974). Yet Murphy, although he had a right to do 
so, see State v. Austin, 295 N. W. 2d 246 (Minn. 1980), did 
not seek clarification of the condition. Without the benefit of 
an authoritative state-court construction of the condition, we 
are hesitant to read into the truthfulness requirement an ad-
ditional obligation that Murphy refrain from raising legiti-
mate objections to furnishing information that might lead to 
his conviction for another crime. ~ 
Whether we employ a subjective or an objective test, there 
is no reasonable basis for concluding that Minnesota at-
tempted to attach an impermissible penalty to the exercise of I 
the privilege against self-incrimination. There is no direct 
evidence that Murphy confessed because he feared that his 
probation would be revoked. Unlike the police officers in 
Garrity v. New Jersey, supra, Murphy was not expressly in-
formed during the crucial meeting with his probation officer 
that an assertion of the privilege would result in the imposi-
1 tion of a penalty. And the fact that Murphy apparently felt 
~
no compunction about adamantly denying the false imprison-
ment charge on which he had been convicted before admit-
\/\ _t/1./ ting to the rape and murder strongly suggests that the 
<I" "threaf't. of revocation did not overwhelm his resistance. 
If Murphy did harbor a belief that his probation might be 
revoked for exercising the Fifth Amendment privilege, that 
belief would not have been reasonable. Our decisions have 
made clear that the State could not constitutionally carry out 
a threat to revoke probation for the legitimate exercise of the 
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neither the State court nor any State officer has suggested 
otherwise. Indeed, in its brief in this Court, the State sub-
mits that it would not, and legally could not, revoke proba-
tion for refusing to answer questions calling for information 
that would incriminate in separate criminal proceedings. 
Brief for Petitioner 36--39, and n. 7. See also Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 7-8, 10-14. 
Minnesota's revocation statute, which was accurately sum-
marized in Murphy's notice of probation, see App. to Pet. for 
Cert. C33-C34, authorizes revocation "[ w ]hen it appears that 
the defendant has violated any of the conditions of his proba-
tion or has otherwise been guilty of misconduct which war-
rants the imposing or execution of sentence." Minn. Stat. 
§ 609.14 (1982). Revocation is not automatic under this pro-
v1s10n. Even- if the ·probation officer desires revocation, a 
probationer must be afforded a hearing, Pearson v. State, 
308 Minn. 287, 289-290, 241 N. W. 2d 490, 492-493 (1976); 
State ex rel. Halverson v. Young, 278 Minn. 381, 386--387, 
154 N. W. 2d 699, 702-703 (1967), and the court must find 
that he violated a specific condition, that the violation was in-
tentional or inexcusable, and that the need for confinement 
outweighs the policies favoring probation. State v. Austin, 
supra, at 250. We have not been advised of any case in 
which Minnesota has attempted to revoke probation merely 
because a probationer refused to make nonimmunized disclo-
sures concerning his own criminal conduct; and, in light of our 
decisions proscribing threats of penalties for the exercise of 
Fifth Amendment rights, Murphy could not reasonably have 
feared that th.~ assertion of the privilege would have led to 
revocation. 
Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Murphy was de-
terred from claiming the privilege by a reasonably perceived 
threat of revocation. 
3 
A third exception to the general requirement of a timely 
asseajon of the Fifth Amendment privilege, closely related 
-
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to the penalty exception, has been developed in the context of 
the federal occupational and excise taxes on gamblers. In 
recognition of the pervasive criminal regulation of gambling 
activities and the fact that claiming the privilege in lieu of fil-
ing a return would tend to incriminate, the Court has held 
that the privilege may be exercised by failing to file. 
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U. S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. 
United States, 390 U. S. 62 (1968). See also Mackey v. 
United States, 401 U. S. 667 (1971). 
"[M]aking a claim of privilege when the disclosures were 
requested, i. e., when the returns were due, would have 
identified the claimant as a gambler. The Court there-
fore forgave the usual requirement that the claim of 
privilege be presented for evaluation in favor of a 'claim' 
by silence. . . . If a particular gambler would not have 
incriminated himself by filing the tax returns, the privi-
lege would not justify a failure to file." Garner v. 
United States, 424 U. S., at 65~59, n. 11. - :.z:::=.. 
But, while a taxpayer who claims the privilege instead of fil-
ing gambling tax returns necessarily identifies himself as a 
gambler, a probationer confronted with incriminating ques-
tions ordinarily will have no problem effectively claiming the 
privilege at the time disclosures are requested. There ex-
ists, therefore, no reason to forgive the requirement that the 
claim be presented for evaluation in a timely manner. 9 
9 Nothing in Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667 (1971), requires a 
different conclusion. In that case, which arose before the Court recog-
nized a privilege not to file gambling tax returns, the taxpayer filed a re-
turn that was introduced as evidence in a criminal prosecution for income 
tax evasion. A majority of the Court considered the disclosures to have 
been compelled incriminations, id. , at 672 (plurality opinion); id., at 
704-705 (BRENNAN, J. , concurring in judgment); id., at 713 (Douglas, J ., 
dissenting), but the taxpayer was not immunized against their use because 
Marchetti and Grosso were not given retroactive effect. Id. , at 674-675 
(plurality opinion); id., at 700-701 (Harlan, J. , concurring in judgment). 
Even assuming that the taxpayer's disclosures would have been excluded if 
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We conclude, in summary, that since Murphy revealed in-
criminating information instead of timely asserting his Fifth 
Amendment privilege, his disclosures were not compelled in-
criminations. Because he was not compelled to incriminate 
himself, Murphy could not successfully invoke the privilege 
to prevent the information he volunteered to his probation of-
ficer from being used against him in a criminal prosecution. 
The judgment is 
Reversed. 
( 
necessarily that a taxpayer would be immunized against use of disclosures 
made on gambling tax returns when the Fifth Amendment would have jus-
tified a failure to file at all." Garner v. United States , 424 U. S. 648, 659, 
n. 13 (1976). In other words, a taxpayer making incriminating disclosures 
on a return filed after Marchetti and Grosso could not necessarily prevent 
the use of those disclosures in a criminal prosecution because he had been 
afforded an effective way to assert the privilege. Respondent Murphy's 
situation, we believe, is analogous to that of the post-Marchetti taxpayer: 
since he could have asserted the privilege effectively but failed to do so, his 
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I of course agree with the result that you reach in 
this case, but have a couple of problems with the way you 
reach it. 
(1) Footnote 5 discusses and discards the "act of 
__ . + ~ grace" and "contract" theories of parole. Based on our 
I~\~~ ~~~opinions in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, and Gagnon v. 
lJJ9 ~ J_ Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, and a couple of scholarly articles, 
~~ o..N...~ :v the footnote announces that both the "act of grace" and 
1k ~~ ½ "contract" theories have been invalidated by these two 
~ ~ ~ - decisions. I would much rather let the two decisions speak 
~.~- t . + for themselves, and see you omit the footnote entirely, 
r'Ns. · \~°1 f\M\ since it does not seem necessary to your analysis at this 
~~~~point. I agree with the implication in the footnote that ·~ w·~ V\ \. 9 ~~-the cited note in Gagnon substantially undermines the "act 
V ·~o of grace" theory, as did the opinion in Morrissey; but 
~- neither dealt with the "contract" theory in express terms, 
and I am unhappy to see it disposed of on the basis of a Law 
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(2) The text on page 15, and the second paragraph in 
footnote 8 on that page, seem to me to decide a case that is 
not here: What would be the conseq uences if the s t ate were 
to provide that invocation of the privilege against self-
incrimination at an interview with the probation officer 
would result in the revocation of probation? I should think 
you could engage in the same analysis by assuming without 
deciding that such procedures would violate the Fifth 
Amendment privilege, and that it is unwise to decide that 
issue when it is unnecessary to do so. 
I also think that if you are going to "cover the 
waterfront" as you apparently wish to do in footnote 8, that 
,,. - -
- 2 -
still another possibility should be discussed in order that 
it not appear to have been precluded by omission. If, for 
example, one of the conditions of my probation is that I 
comport myself as a law abiding citizen, and my probation 
officer asks me during an interview if I have committed any °" ~ ~ crimes since on probation, I may invoke the privilege 
" , !Q~~against self-incrimination; but I would think that my doing 
o ~ .IJ'('-.W"'<'- ~v:~- Jso would permit the probation officer or a judge at a later 
<;,_,b1'ij.N::; ~ - ~ - probation revocation hearing to draw an adverse inference 
from my invocation of the privilege. I think the situation 
is analogous to your treatment of that question in the 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-827 
MINNESOTA, PETITIONER v. MARSHALL 
DONALD MURPHY 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT 
OF MINNESOTA 
[December -, 1983] 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In this case, respondent Murphy, who was on probation, 
made incriminating admissions during a meeting with his pro-
bation officer. The issue before us is whether the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the introduction into evi-
dence of the admissions in Murphy's subsequent criminal 
prosecution. 
I 
In 1974, Marshall Murphy was twice questioned by Minne-
apolis Police concerning the rape and murder of a teenage 
girl. No charges were then brought. In 1980, in connection 
with a prosecution for criminal sexual conduct arising out of 
an unrelated incident, Murphy pleaded guilty to a reduced 
charge of false imprisonment. He was sentenced to a prison 
term of 16 months, which was suspended, and three years' 
probation. The terms of Murphy's probation required, 
among other things, that he participate in a treatment pro-
gram for sexual offenders at Alpha House, report to his pro-
bation officer as directed, and be truthful with the probation 
officer "in all matters." Failure to comply with these condi-
tions, Murphy was informed, could result in his return to the 
sentencing court for a probation revocation hearing. App. to 
Pet. for Cert. C33-C35. 
Murphy met with his probation officer at her office ap-
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out incident until July 1981, when the officer learned that he 
had abandoned the treatment program. The probation offi-
cer then wrote to Murphy and informed him that failure to 
set up a meeting would "result in an immediate request for a 
warrant." Id., at C35. At a meeting in late July, the officer 
agreed not to seek revocation of probation for nonparticipa-
tion in the treatment program since Murphy was employed 
and doing well in other areas. 
In September 1981, an Alpha House counselor informed 
the probation officer that, during the course of treatment, 
Murphy had admitted to a rape and murder in 1974. After 
discussions with her superior, the officer determined that the 
police should have this information. 1 She then wrote to 
Murphy and asked him to contact her to discuss a treatment 
plan for the remainder of his probationary period. 2 Al-
though she did not contact the police before the meeting, the 
probation officer knew in advance that she would report any 
incriminating statements. 
Upon receipt of the letter, Murphy arranged to meet with 
his probation officer in her office on September 28, 1981. 
The officer opened the meeting by telling Murphy about the 
1 The parties stipulated in the trial court that Alpha House was covered 
by federal statutes providing for the confidentiality of patient records in 
federally assisted drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs, 21 U. S. C. 
§ 1175 and 42 U. S. C. § 4582, and the regulations adopted pursuant 
thereto, 42 CFR pt. 2 (1982). Although the Alpha House counselor legiti-
mately informed Murphy's probation officer of his incriminating admis-
sions, we assume, without deciding, that the counselor could not have pro-
vided the information to the police. See id., at§§ 2.39(a), 2.63; Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 6. We assume, as well, that the probation officer could not have 
made the counselor's information available for use in a criminal prosecu-
tion. See id., at § 2.39(d); Tr. of Oral Arg. 6-7. 
2 It is unclear whether the probation officer could have ordered Murphy 
to pursue additional treatment as a condition of probation. App. to Pet. 
for Cert. C14 (testimony of Mara Widseth). But there is no evidence that 
she used treatment as a subterfuge or that her sole purpose was to obtain 
incriminating statements for the police. Under our view of the case, such 
a purpose would not change the result. Post, at --. 
-
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information she had received from the Alpha House counselor 
and expressing her belief that this information evinced his 
continued need for treatment. Murphy became angry about 
what he considered to be a breach of his confidences and 
stated that he "felt like calling a lawyer." 3 The probation 
officer replied that Murphy would have to deal with that 
problem outside the office; for the moment, their primary 
concern was the relationship between the crimes that Mur-
phy had admitted to the Alpha House counselor and the inci-
dent that led to his conviction for false imprisonment. 
During the course of the meeting, Murphy denied the false 
imprisonment charge, admitted that he had committed the 
rape and murder, and attempted to persuade the probation 
officer that further treatment was unnecessary because sev-
eral extenuating circumstances explained the prior crimes. 
At the conclusion of the meeting, the officer told Murphy that 
she had a duty to relay the information to the authorities and 
encouraged him to turn himself in. Murphy then left the of-
fice. Two days later, Murphy called his probation officer 
and told her that he had been advised by counsel not to sur-
render himself to the police. The officer then procured the 
issuance of an arrest and detention order from the judge who 
3 The trial court concluded that Murphy's statement did not constitute 
an invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination: "[W]hatever his 
real intent may have been, we are persuaded by the probation officer's tes-
timony that he did not express [the] desire [to talk to an attorney] in any 
context other than a civil suit for the breach of confidentiality." App. to 
Pet. for Cert. B13-B14. The Minnesota Supreme Court did not reach this 
question, and, although we see no reason to question the trial court's fac-
tual finding, our analysis of the case makes further consideration unnec-
essary. Although a request for a lawyer during custodial interrogation is 
sufficient to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination, Fare v. Mi-
chael C., 442 U. S. 707, 709 (1979), Murphy was not in custody, post, at 
--, and he had no federal right to have an attorney present at the meet-
ing. See United States v. R ea, 678 F . 2d 382, 390 (CA2 1982); People v. 
Ronald W., 31 App. Div. 2d 163,165,295 N. Y. S. 2d 767, 769 (1968), aff'd, 
24 N. Y. 2d 732, 249 N. E. 2d 882, 302 N. Y. S. 2d 260 (1969); Hughes v. 
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had sentenced Murphy on the false imprisonment charge. 
On October 29, 1981, a State grand jury returned an indict-
ment charging Murphy with first-degree murder. 
Murphy sought to suppress testimony concerning his con-
fession on the ground that it was obtained in violation of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court found 
that he was not "in custody'' at the time of the statement and 
that the confession was neither compelled nor involuntary de-
spite the absence of warnings similar to those required by 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966). The Minnesota 
Supreme Court reversed on federal constitutional grounds. 
Although recognizing that the Fifth Amendment privilege 
generally is not self-executing, it concluded that, notwith-
standing the lack of custody in the usual sense, Murphy's fail-
ure to claim the privilege when he was questioned was not 
fatal to his claim "[b ]ecause of the compulsory nature of the 
meeting, because [Murphy] was under court order to respond 
truthfully to his agent's questions, and because the agent had 
substantial reason to believe that [Murphy's] answers were 
likely to be incriminating." 324 N. W. 2d 340, 344 (Minn. 
1982). In the court's view, "the agent should have warned 
[Murphy] of his privilege against self-incrimination before 
she questioned him and ... her failure to do so, when she 
had already decided to report his answers to the police, bars 
use of [Murphy's] confession at this trial. " Ibid. 
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among state and 
federal courts concerning whether a statement made by a 
probationer to his probation officer without prior warnings is 
admissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding. 459 U. S. 
-- (1983).4 We now reverse. 
• Compare, e. g., United States v. Steele, 419 F. Supp. 1385, 1386-1387 
(W. D. Pa. 1976); People v. Garcia, 240 Cal. App. 2d 9, 12-13, 49 Cal. 
Rptr. 146, 148 (1966); and State v. Lekas, 201 Kan. 579, 582-584, 442 P. 2d 
11, 15-16 (1968), with, e.g., United States v. Miller, 643 F. 2d 713, 715 







The Fifth Amendment, in relevant part, provides that no 
person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself." It has long been held that this prohi-
bition not only permits a person to refuse to testify against 
himself at a criminal trial in which he is a defendant, but also 
"privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in 
any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, 
where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal 
proceedings." Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S. 70, 77 (1973). 
In all such proceedings, 
"a witness protected by the privilege may rightfully 
refuse to answer unless and until he is protected at least 
against the use of his compelled answers and evidence 
derived therefrom in any subsequent criminal case in 
which he is a defendant. . . . Absent such protection, if 
he is nevertheless compelled to answer, his answers are 
inadmissible against him in a later criminal prosecution." 
Id., at 78. 
A defendant does not lose this protection by reason of his con-
viction of a crime; notwithstanding that a defendant is impris-
oned or on probation at the time he makes incriminating 
statements, if those statements are compelled they are inad-
missible in a subsequent trial for a crime other than that for 
which he has been convicted. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 
425 U. S. 308, 316 (1976). The issue in this case is whether 
the Fifth Amendment right that Murphy enjoyed was vio-
lated by the admission into evidence at his trial for another 
crime of the prior statements made by him to his probation 
officer. 
444 U. S. 873 (1979); Nettles v. State, 248 So. 2d 259, 260 (Fla. App. 1971); 
Connell v. State , 131 Ga. App. 213, 205 S. E . 2d 513, 514 (1974); State 
v. Hartman, 281 N. W. 2d 639, 643--644 (Iowa App. 1979); and People v. 
Parker, 101 Misc. 2d 800, 802--804, 421 N. Y. S. 2d 561, 562-563 (1979). 
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We note first that the general obligation to appear and an-
swer questions truthfully did not in itself convert Murphy's 
otherwise voluntary statements into compelled ones. In 
that respect, Murphy was in no better position than the ordi-
nary witness at a trial or before a grand jury who is subpoe-
naed, sworn to tell the truth, and obligated to answer on the 
pain of contempt, unless he invokes the privilege and shows 
that he faces a realistic threat of incriminating himself. The 
answers of such a witness to questions put to him are not 
compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment unless 
the witness is required to answer over his valid claim of the 
privilege. This much is reasonably clear from our cases. 
As this Court has long acknowledged, 
"[t]he [Fifth] Amendment speaks of compulsion. It 
does not preclude a witness from testifying voluntarily in 
matters which may incriminate him. If, therefore, he 
desires the protection of the privilege, he must claim it 
or he will not be considered to have been 'compelled' 
within the meaning of the Amendment." United States 
v. Mania, 317 U. S. 424, 427 (1943) (footnote omitted). 
This principle has been applied in cases involving a variety of 
criminal and noncriminal investigations. See, e.g., United 
States v. Kordel, 397 U. S. 1, 7-10 (1970); Rogers v. United 
States, 340 U. S. 367, 370-371 (1951); Vajtauer v. Commis-
sioner of Immigration, 273 U. S. 103, 112-113 (1927). 
These cases, taken together, "stand for the proposition that, 
in the ordinary case, if a witness under compulsion to testify 
makes disclosures instead of claiming the privilege, the gov-
ernment has not 'compelled' him to incriminate himself." 
Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 654 (1976) (footnote 
omitted). Witnesses who failed to claim the privilege were 
once said to have "waived" it, but we have recently aban-
doned this "vague term," Green v. United States, 355 U. S. 
184, 191 (1957), and "made clear that an individual may lose 
82--827-0PINION 
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the benefit of the privilege without making a knowing and 
intelligent waiver." Garner v. United States, supra, at 654, 
n. 9. 
Although we have sometimes suggested in dicta that the 
usual rule might give way in situations where the govern-
ment has "substantial reason to believe that the requested 
disclosures are likely to be incriminating," Roberts v. United 
States, 445 U. S. 552, 559 (1980), we have never adopted the 
view that a witness must "put the Government on notice by 
formally availing himself of the privilege" only when he alone 
"is reasonably aware of the incriminating tendency of the 
questions." Id., at 562, n. * (BRENNAN, J., concurring). It 
has long been recognized that "[t]he Constitution does not 
forbid the asking of criminative questions," United States v. 
Monia, supra, at 433 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), and noth-
ing in our prior cases suggests that the incriminating nature 
of a question, by itself, excuses a timely assertion of the priv-
ilege. See, e.g., United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S. 
564, 574-575 (1976) (plurality opinion). If a witness-even 
one under a general compulsion to testify-answers a ques-
tion that both he and the government should reasonably ex-
pect to incriminate him, the Court need ask only whether the 
particular disclosure was "compelled" within the meaning of 
the Fifth Amendment. 
United States v. Kordel, supra, perhaps the first case 
squarely to hold that a witness under compulsion to make dis-
closures must assert the privilege in a timely manner, is illus-
trative. In answering interrogatories submitted by the Gov-
ernment in a civil case against a corporation, a corporate 
officer who had been notified of contemplated criminal action 
against him supplied evidence and leads helpful in securing 
his indictment and conviction. Although the relationship be-
tween the civil and criminal actions was clear and "[ w ]ithout 
question [the officer] could have invoked his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege," 397 U. S., at 7, he did not do so. The Court 
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assert the constitutional privilege leaves him in no position to 
complain now that he was compelled to give testimony 
against himself." Id., at 10 (footnote omitted). 
B 
Thus it is that a witness confronted with questions that the 
government should reasonably expect to elicit incriminating 
evidence ordinarily must assert the privilege rather than an-
swer if he desires not to incriminate himself. If he asserts 
the privilege, he "may not be required to answer a question if 
there is some rational basis for believing that it will incrimi-
nate him, at least without at that time being assured that nei-
ther it nor its fruits may be used against him" in a subsequent 
criminal proceeding. Maness v. Myers, 419 U. S. 449, 473 
(1976) (WHITE, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). But if 
he chooses to answer, his choice is considered to be voluntary 
since he was free to claim the privilege and would suffer no 
penalty as the result of his decision to do so. As the Minne-
sota Supreme Court recognized, application of this general 
rule is inappropriate in certain well-defined situations. In 
each of those . situations, however, some identifiable factor 
"was held to deny the individual a 'free choice to admit, to 
deny, or to refuse to answer."' Garner v. United States, 
supra, at 657, quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 
241 (1941). Because we conclude that no such factor was 
present here, we hold that the Minnesota Supreme Court 
erred in excluding the probation officer's testimony. 
1 
A well-known exception to the general rule addresses the 
problem of confessions obtained from suspects in police cus-
tody. 5 Not only is custodial interrogation ordinarily con-
ducted by officers who are "acutely aware of the potentially 
•We emphasize that Murphy was not under arrest and that he was free 
to leave at the end of the meeting. A different question would be pre- ,..._A. • A .A I MA-, 
sented if he had been interviewed by his probationeF- officer while being O YVV'--"__., v w 
held in police custody°' by the police themselves in a custodial : n~ ~ 1N_ l,_\l~\\,M~, 
¼~. °\ ¾ ~• ~ (v\\Jvf~\ ~ 
b~ 1-v---. ~½, I\ v~_l;}w:S. ~uJ 
\°'J ~~~~- V-i_ ~ ~ l\W 
~ ~~' V) Nv\f\\J'~~~ , 
-
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incriminatory nature of the disclosures sought," ibid., but 
also the custodial setting is thought to contain "inherently 
compelling pressures which work to undermine the individ-
ual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would 
not otherwise do so freely." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., 
at 467. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 
246-247 (1973). To dissipate "the overbearing compulsion 
. . . caused by isolation of a suspect in police custody," 
United States v. Washington, 431 U. S. 181, 187, n. 5 (1977), 
the Miranda Court required the exclusion of incriminating 
statements obtained during custodial interrogation unless the 
suspect fails to claim the Fifth Amendment privilege after 
being suitably warned of his right to remain silent and of the 
consequences of his failure to assert it. 384 U. S., at 
467-469, 475-477. We have consistently held, however, that 
this extraordinary safeguard "does not apply outside the con-
text of the inherently coercive custodial interrogations for 
which it was designed." Roberts v. United States, 445 
U. S., at 560. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that Murphy 
was not "in custody" when he made his incriminating admis-
sions. He was, to be sure, subject to a number of restrictive 
conditions governing various aspects of his life, and he would 
be regarded as "in custody'' for purposes of federal habeas 
corpus. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U. S. 236, 241-243 
(1963). But custody in that context has been defined broadly 
to effectuate the purposes of the writ, id., at 243; Hensley v. 
Municipal Court, 411 U. S. 345, 349-351 (1973), and custody 
for Miranda purposes has been more narrowly circum-
scribed. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492 (1977) ( per 
curiam). Under the narrower standard appropriate in the 
Miranda context, it is clear that Murphy was not "in cus-
tody" for purposes of receiving Miranda protection since 
there was no "'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of move-
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fornia v. Beheler, 463 U. S. --, -- (1983) (per curiam), 
quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, supra, at 495. 
Notwithstanding the inapplicability of Miranda, the Min-
nesota Supreme Court held that the probation officer's failure 
to inform Murphy of the Fifth Amendment privilege barred 
use of his confession at trial. Four factors have been ad-
vanced in support of this conclusion, but we find them, alone 
or in combination, insufficient to excuse Murphy's failure to 
claim the privilege in a timely manner. 
First, the probation officer could compel Murphy's atten-
dance and truthful answers. The Minnesota Supreme Court 
failed to explain how this transformed a routine interview 
into an inherently coercive setting. In our view, this factor 
subjected Murphy to less intimidating pressure than is im-
posed on grand jury witnesses, who are sworn to tell the 
truth and placed in a setting conducive to truthtelling. Al-
though warnings in both contexts might serve to dissipate 
"any possible coercion or unfairness resulting from a witness' 
misimpression that he must answer truthfully even questions 
with incriminating aspects," United States v. Washington, 
supra, at 188, we have never held that they must be given to 
grand jury witnesses, id., at 186, and we decline to require 
them here since the totality of the circumstances is not such 
as to overbear a probationer's free will. See Rogers v. Rich-
mond, 365 U. S. 534, 544 (1961). 
Second, the probation officer consciously sought incrimi-
nating evidence. We have already explained that this factor 
does not give rise to a self-executing privilege, ante, at--, 
and we pause here only to emphasize that police officers 
questioning persons suspected of crimes of ten consciously 
seek incriminating statements. The mere fact that an inves-
tigation has focused on a suspect does not trigger the need for 
Miranda warnings in noncustodial settings, Beckwith v. 
United States, 425 U. S. 341 (1976), and the probation offi-
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Third, Murphy did not expect questions about prior crimi-
nal conduct and could not seek counsel before attending the 
meeting. But the nature of probation is such that probation-
ers should expect to be questioned on a wide range of topics 
relating to their past criminality. Moreover, the probation 
ofpcer's letter, which suggested a need to discuss treatment 
from which Murphy had already been excused, would have 
led a reasonable probationer to conclude that new informa-
tion had come to her attention. In any event, Murphy's situ-
ation was in this regard indistinguishable from that facing 
suspects who are questioned in noncustodial settings and 
grand jury witnesses who are unaware of the scope of an in-
vestigation or that they are considered potential defendants. 
See United States v. Washington, supra, at 188-189; 
Beckwith v. United States, supra, at 346-348. 
Fourth, there were no observers to guard against abuse or 
trickery. Again, this often will be true when a suspect is 
subjected to noncustodial interrogation, where no warnings 
are required. Murphy does not allege that the probation of-
ficer was not legitimately concerned with the need for further 
treatment, and we cannot conclude that her actions would 
have led a reasonable probationer to believe that his state-
ments to her would remain confidential. A probationer can-
not pretend ignorance of the fact that his probation officer "is 
a peace officer, and as such is allied, to a greater or lesser 
extent, with his fellow peace officers." Fare v. Michael C., 
442 U. S. 707, 720 (1979). See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 
U. S. 432, 447 (1982). Absent some express or implied 
promise to the contrary, he may also be charged with knowl-
edge that "the probation officer is duty bound to report 
wrongdoing by the [probationer] when it comes to his atten-
tion, even if by communication from the [probationer] him-
self." Fare v. Michael C., supra, at 720. The fact that 
Murphy apparently expressed no surprise on being informed 
that his statements would be made available to the police, 
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expectation that his statements would remain confidential. 
See App. to Pet. for Cert. C21 (testimony of Mara Widseth); 
id., at C28 (testimony of Marshall Murphy). 
Even a cursory comparison of custodial interrogation and 
probation interviews reveals the inaptness of the Minnesota 
Supreme Court's analogy to Miranda. Custodial arrest is 
said to convey to the suspect a message that he has no choice 
but to submit to the officers' will and to confess. Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U. S., at 456--457. It is unlikely that a proba-
tion interview, arranged by appointment at a mutually conve-
nient time, would give rise to a similar impression. More-
over, custodial arrest thrusts an individual into "an 
unfamiliar atmosphere" or "an interrogation environment 
... created for no purpose other than to subjugate the indi-
vidual to the will of his examiner." Id., at 457. Many of the 
psychological ploys discussed in Miranda capitalize on the 
suspect's unfamiliarity with the officers and the environment. 
Murphy's regular meetings with his probation officer should 
have served to familiarize him with her and her office and to 
insulate him from psychological intimidation that might over-
bear his desire to claim the privilege. Finally, the coercion 
inherent in custodial interrogation derives in large measure 
from an interrogator's insinuations that the interrogation will 
continue until a confession is obtained. Id., at 468. Since 
Murphy was not physically restrained and could have left the 
office, any compulsion he might have felt from the possibility 
that terminating the meeting would have led to revocation of 
probation was not comparable to the pressure on a suspect 
who is painfully aware that he literally cannot escape a 
persistent custodial interrogator. 6 
•Neither the trial court nor the Minnesota Supreme Court found that 
Murphy believed that his probation could have been revoked for leaving 
the meeting or that he remained in the office for this reason. Since the 
meeting was scheduled at a mutually convenient time and was arranged 
pursuant to a request that did not include any threat, it is unlikely that 
-
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We conclude, therefore, that Murphy cannot claim the ben-
efit of the first exception to the general rule that the Fifth 
Amendment privilege is not self-executing. 
2 
The general rule that the privilege must be claimed when 
self-incrimination is threatened has also been deemed inappli-
cable in cases where the assertion of the privilege is penalized 
so as to "foreclos[e] a free choice to remain silent, and ... 
compe[l] ... incriminating testimony." Garner v. United 
States, 424 U. S., at 661. Because revocation of his proba-
tion was threatened if he refused to respond to the questions 
put to him by his probation officer, Murphy argues that he 
was compelled to make incriminating disclosures instead of 
claiming the privilege. Although this contention is not with-
out force, we find it unpersuasive on close examination. 
In each of the so-called "penalty" cases, the state not only 
compelled an individual to appear and testify, but also sought 
to induce him to forego the Fifth Amendment privilege by 
threatening to impose economic or other sanctions "capable of 
forcing the self-incrimination which the Amendment forbids." 
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U. S. 801, 806 (1977). In 
most of the cases, the attempt to override the witnesses' 
privilege proved unsuccessful, and the Court ruled that the 
state could not constitutionally make good on its prior threat. 
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S., at 79-84; Sanitation Men v. 
Commissioner of Sanitation, 392 U. S. 280, 283-284 (1968); 
Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S. 273, 278-279 (1968). These 
cases make clear that "a State may not impose substantial 
penalties because a witness elects to exercise his Fifth 
Amendment right not to give incriminating testimony against 
himself." Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, supra, at 805. Occa-
sionally, however, an individual succumbed to the pressure 
placed upon him, failed to assert the privilege, and disclosed 
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incriminating information, which the state later sought to use 
against him in a criminal prosecution. Garrity v. New J er-
sey, 385 U. S. 493 (1967), was such a case, and the Court held 
that an individual threatened with discharge from employ-
ment for exercising the privilege had not waived it by re-
sponding to questions rather than standing on his right to re-
main silent. Id., at 498-499. 
The threat of punishment for reliance on the privilege 
distinguishes cases of this sort from the ordinary case in 
which a witness is merely required to appear and give testi-
mony. A state may require a probationer to appear and dis-
cuss matters that affect his probationary status; such a re-
quirement, without more, does not give rise to a 
self-executing privilege. The result may be different if the 
questions put to the probationer, however relevant to his 
probationary status, call for answers that would incriminate 
him in a pending or later criminal prosecution. There is thus \ 
a substantial basis in our cases for concluding that if the 
state, either expressly or by implication, asserts that invoca-
tion of the privilege would lead to revocation of probation, it 
would have created the classic penalty situation, the failure 
to assert the privilege would be excused, and the probation-
er's answers would be deemed compelled and inadmissible in 
a criminal prosecution. 7 
7 The situation would be different if the questions put to a probationer 
were relevant to his probationary status and posed no realistic threat of 
incrimination in a separate criminal proceeding. If, for example, a resi-
dential restriction were imposed as a condition of probation, it would ap-
pear unlikely that a violation of that condition would be a criminal act. 
Hence, a claim of the Fifth Amendment privilege in response to questions 
relating to a residential condition could not validly rest on the ground that 
the answer might be used to incriminate if the probationer was tried for 
another crime. Neither, in our view, would the privilege be available on 
the ground that answering such questions might reveal a violation of the 
residential requirement and result in the termination of probation. Al-
though a revocation proceeding must comport with the requirements of 
due process, it is not a criminal proceeding. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 
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Even so we must inquire whether Murphy's probation con-
ditions merely required him to appear and give testimony 
about matters relevant to his probationary status or whether 
they went farther and required him to choose between mak-
ing incriminating statements and jeopardizing his conditional 
liberty by remaining silent. Because we conclude that Min-
nesota did not attempt to take the extra, impermissible step, 
we hold that Murphy's Fifth Amendment privilege was not 
self-executing. 
As we have already indicated, Murphy was informed that 
he was required to be truthful with his probation officer in all 
matters and that failure to do so could result in revocation of 
probation. The opinion of the Minnesota Supreme Court 
made clear that this was indeed the case, but its conclusion 
that the probation officer's failure to give Murphy adequate 
warnings barred the use of his incriminating statements in 
U. S. 778, 782 (1973); United States v. Johnson, 455 F. 2d 932, 933 (CA5), 
cert. denied, 409 U. S. 856 (1972). Just as there is no right to a jury trial 
before probation may be revoked, neither is the privilege against com-
pelled self-incrimination available to a probationer. It follows that 
whether or not the answer to a question about a residential requirement is 
compelled by the threat of revocation, there can be no valid claim of the 
privilege on the ground that the information sought can be used against 
him in revocation proceedings. 
Our cases indicate, moreover, that a state may validly insist on answers 
to even incriminating questions and hence sensibly administer its probation 
system, as long as it recognizes that the required answers may not be used 
in a criminal proceeding and thus eliminates the threat of incrimination. 
Under such circumstances, a probationer's "right to immunity as a result of 
his compelled testimony would not be at stake," Sanitation Men v. Com-
missioner of Sanitation, 392 U. S. 280, 284 (1968); see Lefkowitz v. Cun-
ningham, 431 U. S. 801, 805--806 (1977); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S. 70, 
84-85 (1973); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S. 273, 278 (1968), and nothing 
in the Federal Constitution would prevent a State from revoking probation 
for a refusal to answer that violated an express condition of probation or 
from using the probationer's silence as "one of a number of factors to be 
considered by a finder of fact" in deciding whether other conditions of pro-
bation have been violated. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, supa, at 808, n. 5. 
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the criminal trial did not rest on the ground that a refusal to 
furnish incriminating information would have justified revo-
cation of probation. Although the court recognized that im-
posing a penalty for a valid exercise of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege could impermissibly foreclose a free choice to re-
main silent, 324 N. W. 2d, at 342-343, it did not purport to 
find that Minnesota's probation revocation statute had such 
an effect. The court relied instead on the fact that Murphy 
was under legal compulsion to attend the meeting and to an-
swer truthfully the questions of a probation officer who antic-
ipated incriminating answers. Id., at 344. Such compul-
sion, however, is indistinguishable from that felt by any 
witness who is required to appear and give testimony, and, 
as we have already made clear, it is insufficient to excuse 
Murphy's failure to exercise the privilege in a timely manner. 
The State court did not attempt to define the precise con-
tours of Murphy's obligation to respond to questions. On its 
face, Murphy's probation condition proscribed only false 
statements; it said nothing about his freedom to decline to an-
swer particular questions and certainly contained no sugges-
tion that his probation was conditional on his waiving his 
Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to further criminal 
prosecution. "At this point in our history virtually every 
schoolboy is familiar with the concept, if not the language, of 
the [Fifth Amendment]." Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 
433, 439 (1974). Yet Murphy, although he had a right to do 
so, see State v. Austin, 295 N. W. 2d 246 (Minn. 1980), did 
not seek clarification of the condition. Without the benefit of 
an authoritative state-court construction of the condition, we 
are hesitant to read into the truthfulness requirement an ad-
ditional obligation that Murphy refrain from raising legiti-
mate objections to furnishing information that might lead to 
his conviction for another crime. 
Whether we employ a subjective or an objective test, there 
is no reasonable basis for concluding that Minnesota at-
tempted to attach an impermissible penalty to the exercise of 
-
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the privilege against self-incrimination. There is no direct 
evidence that Murphy confessed because he feared that his 
probation would be revoked if he remained silent. Unlike 
the police officers in Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U. S. 493 
(1967), Murphy was not expressly informed during the crucial 
meeting with his probation officer that an assertion of the 
privilege would result in the imposition of a penalty. And 
the fact that Murphy apparently felt no compunction about 
adamantly denying the false imprisonment charge on which 
he had been convicted before admitting to the rape and 
murder strongly suggests that the "threat" of revocation did 
not overwhelm his resistance. 
If Murphy did harbor a belief that his probation might be 
revoked for exercising the Fifth Amendment privilege, that 
belief would not have been reasonable. Our decisions have 
made clear that the State could not constitutionally carry out 
a threat to revoke probation for the legitimate exercise of the 
Fifth Amendment privilege. It is not surprising, then, that 
neither the State court nor any State officer has suggested 
otherwise. Indeed, in its brief in this Court, the State sub-
mits that it would not, and legally could not, revoke proba-
tion for refusing to answer questions calling for information 
that would incriminate in separate criminal proceedings. 
Brief for Petitioner 36-39, and n. 7. See also Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 7-8, 10-14. 
Minnesota's revocation statute, which was accurately sum-
marized in Murphy's notice of probation, see App. to Pet. for 
Cert. C33-C34, authorizes revocation "[ w ]hen it appears that 
the defendant has violated any of the conditions of his proba-
tion or has otherwise been guilty of misconduct which war-
rants the imposing or execution of sentence." Minn. Stat. 
§ 609.14 (1982). Revocation is not automatic under this pro-
VIs10n. Even if the probation officer desires revocation, a 
probationer must be afforded a hearing, Pearson v. State, 
308 Minn. 287, 289-290, 241 N. W. 2d 490, 492-493 (1976); 
State ex rel. Halverson v. Young, 278 Minn. 381, 386-387, 
18 
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154 N. W. 2d 699, 702--703 (1967), and the court must find 
that he violated a specific condition, that the violation was in-
tentional or inexcusable, and that the need for confinement 
outweighs the policies favoring probation. State v. Austin, 
supra, at 250. We have not been advised of any case in 
which Minnesota has attempted to revoke probation merely 
because a probationer refused to make nonimmunized disclo-
sures concerning his own criminal conduct; and, in light of our 
decisions proscribing threats of penalties for the exercise of 
Fifth Amendment rights, Murphy could not reasonably have 
feared that the assertion of the privilege would have led to 
revocation. 
Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Murphy was de-
terred from claiming the privilege by a reasonably perceived 
threat of revocation. 
3 
A third exception to the general requirement of a timely 
assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege, closely related 
to the penalty exception, has been developed in the context of 
the federal occupational and excise taxes on gamblers. In 
recognition of the pervasive criminal regulation of gambling 
activities and the fact that claiming the privilege in lieu of fil-
ing a return would tend to incriminate, the Court has held 
that the privilege may be exercised by failing to file. 
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U. S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. 
United States, 390 U. S. 62 (1968). See also Mackey v. 
United States, 401 U. S. 667 (1971). 
"[M]aking a claim of privilege when the disclosures were 
requested, i. e., when the returns were due, would have 
identified the claimant as a gambler. The Court there-
fore forgave the usual requirement that the claim of 
privilege be presented for evaluation in favor of a 'claim' 
by silence. . . . If a particular gambler would not have 
incriminated himself by filing the tax returns, the privi-
lege would not justify a failure to file." Garner v. 
United States, 424 U. S., at 658-659, n. 11. 
-
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But, while a taxpayer who claims the privilege instead of fil-
ing gambling tax returns necessarily identifies himself as a 
gambler, a probationer confronted with incriminating ques-
tions ordinarily will have no problem effectively claiming the 
privilege at the time disclosures are requested. There ex-
ists, therefore, no reason to forgive the requirement that the 
claim be presented for evaluation in a timely manner. 8 
III 
We conclude, in summary, that since Murphy revealed in-
criminating information instead of timely asserting his Fifth 
Amendment privilege, his disclosures were not compelled in-
criminations. Because he had not been compelled to incrimi-
nate himself, Murphy could not successfully invoke the privi-
lege to prevent the information he volunteered to his 
probation officer from being used against him in a criminal 
prosecution. 
The judgment is 
Reversed. 
8 Nothing in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971), requires a 
different conclusion. In that case, which arose before the Court recog-
nized a privilege not to file gambling tax returns, the taxpayer filed a re-
turn that was introduced as evidence in a criminal prosecution for income 
tax evasion. A majority of the Court considered the disclosures to have 
been compelled incriminations, id., at 672 (plurality opinion); id., at 
704-705 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 713 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting), but the taxpayer was not immunized against their use because 
Marchetti and Grosso were not given retroactive effect. Id., at 674-675 
(plurality opinion); id., at 700-701 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment). 
Even assuming that the taxpayer's disclosures would have been excluded if 
we had applied Marchetti and Grosso retroactively, "[i]t does not follow 
necessarily that a taxpayer would be immunized against use of disclosures 
made on gambling tax returns when the Fifth Amendment would have jus-
tified a failure to file at all." Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 648, 659, 
n. 13 (1976). In other words, a taxpayer making incriminating disclosures 
on a return filed after Marchetti and Grosso could not necessarily prevent 
the use of those disclosures in a criminal prosecution because he had been 
afforded an effective way to assert the privilege. Murphy's situation, we 
believe, is analogous to that of the post-Marchetti taxpayer: since he could 
have asserted the privilege effectively but failed to do so, his disclosures 
cannot be viewed as compelled incriminations. 
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new findings of fact. The case should be sent back to 
the state courts for further factfinding. 
Third, and perhaps of greatest importance, your 
ultimate disposition depends on the resolution of a 
question of Minnesota law that I believe should be 
decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court, not by this 
Court. The conditions of Murphy's probation required 
him to be truthful with his probation officer in all 
matters. That obligation might be interpreted in at 
least four different ways: (1) if you answer a 
question, you must tell the truth but you are not 
obligated to answer if you choose not to do so; (2) if 
you answer, you must be truthful but you need not 
answer any incriminating questions; (3) if you answer 
you must be truthful but you need not answer any 
incriminating questions concerning pre-probation 
matters; or (4) you must be truthful and you must 
answer any question that is asked by the probation 
officer. 
~ k~~~ .. 
~·~ · ~ Your opinion decides, as a matter of Minnesota 
~~ S NV<-1':I ;: law, that the probation condition does not have the 
\ ~\)'<'-~'- fourth meaning. It seems to me that this is precisely 
~'\_\~0-.'w\,k._ the sort of question that the Minnesota Supreme Court 
,u--h s~l "-10 should answer for us rather than vice versa. 
k_~c...~-¥ ( "'Y-o.G I also wonder if it is wise to saddle Minnesota 
~~-~<a-.~~ ith the construction of its probation statute adopted 
l {{\ ~. ~~, ~ in your opir:tion. 1:s rou recognize at page 1~ n. 7, a 
y \\ -~ v:, ~ State may wish to insist on answers to questions 
~ ~~ _relating to the probationer's compliance with his 
~.,-.J, V) 1,VN/,~ conditions of probation in order to "sensibly 
. ~~ • ~ 6--<{QJL administer its probation system." Minnesota might well 
~ l\~<t.. I,.)~. want to adopt this approach, and might construe its 
j '~ ~ statute to make Murphy's silence in the face of 
. fch~,..,µ- uestions about the conditions of his probation a basis 
~~ ~ ~ - for revocation of probation. If so, then, as you 
c:.. Q.>"-~ ~--e, recognize, this would create a penalty on Murphy's 
~ c ~ ~ight to remain silent and require that Murphy's 
.,...~ t,... b~~ answers to Widseth' s questions not be used against him 
-'~ \.>,-,..,~"" in a subsequent er iminal prosecution. At a minimum, I 
. ~{~ C-1:.'- think we should leave the policy choice whether to 
~,{' u\~L• At ermit a probationer to remain silent or to prohibit 
~ ~ silence _bu~ immunize the compelled answers to the 
~. ~ , , ~~ h~ \Ait,U.,,~,~.\ii S.~k<,\ P'IJ~u~ N.Voc.w~- 1.l ~ ~ ,S;MC\.. 
~~t~ v ti~~ , ~ r<CbG~, ~~ ~;\ ~~~"' ~~ ~ ~"'&__ \,j °" 
~ lj,._~t ~ c:,~ (J..._ ' 
- -3- -
Minnesota Supreme Court. In the absence of any 
authoritative decisions on this point, I would not 
assume, as you do, that Minnesota would be content to 
let its probationers remain silent when asked questions 
about their compliance with their conditions of 
probation. And in the absence of an authoritative 
decision, I would be hard pressed to say, as you do, 
that Murphy could not have reasonably believed that 
Minnesota might decide to treat silence as a basis for 
revocation of his probation. 
In sum, I am still not entirely at rest in this 
case and will wait to see what the dissent has to say. 
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Dear Byron: 
Although I agree with a large part of what you 
have written, three points in your opinion disturb me. 
First, although I am not sure that the remedy for 
a violation of 42 u.s.c. §4582 should be the exclusion 
of otherwise admissible testimony, it does seem to me 
that the probation officer was somewhat deceptive in 
the way she was able to circumvent the protection a 
federal statute was intended to provide. Your opinion 
seems implicitly to approve of her conduct. 
Second, in part II (B) (1) (pp. 9-13) you seem to be 
making a finding of fact that Murphy had no reason for 
believing that he could refuse to answer questions 
although his answers might incriminate him. I think 
many probationers would interpret the terms of their 
probation differently. Even if you are right, it seems 
to me that we should not attempt to make a finding of 
fact as to what it was t hat Murphy had reason to 
believe. No such finding was made on this point in the 
state courts. To the extent there is any finding on 
this point, it tends to argue against your conclusion. 
The trial court wrote: "[T]he fact [is] that a 
condition of his [Murphy's] probation was that he be 
honest with his probation officer, and that he was 
there ostensibly to disc uss further tratment in regard 
to his current condition. Failure to follow through 
with either of these could have resulted in revocation 
of the probation and potential imprisonment." Pet. for 
Cert. B-14. If the case turns on what it was that 
Murphy had reason to believe, as it seems to, then I 
think we should follow o u r usual practice and not make 
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new findings of fact. The case should be sent back to 
the st~te courts for further factfinding. 
Third, and perhaps of greatest importance, your 
ultimate disposition depends on the resolution of a 
question of Minnesota law that I believe should be 
decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court, not by this 
Court. The conditions of Murphy's probation required 
him to be truthful with his probation officer in all 
matters. That obligation might be interpreted in at 
least four different ways: (1) if you answer a 
question, you must tell the truth but you are not 
obligated to answer if you choose not to do so; (2) if 
you answer, you must be truthful but you need not 
answer any incriminating questions; (3) if you answer 
you must be truthful but you need not answer any 
incriminating questions concerning pre-probation 
matters; or (4) you must be truthful and you must 
answer any question that is asked by the probation 
officer. 
Your op1n1on decides, as a matter of Minnesota 
law, that the probation condition does not have the 
fourth meaning. It seems to me that this is precisely 
the sort of question that the Minnesota Supreme Court 
should answer for us rather than vice versa. 
I also wonder if it is wise to saddle Minnesota 
with the construction of its probation statute adopted 
in your op1n1on. As you recognize at page 15 n. 7, a 
State may wish to insist on answers to questions 
relating to the probationer's compliance with his 
conditions of probation in order to "sensibly 
administer its probation system." Minnesota might well 
want to adopt this approach, and might construe its 
statute to make Murphy's silence in the face of 
questions about the conditions of his probation a basis 
for revocation of probation. If so, then, as you 
recogn i ze, this would create a penalty on Murphy's 
right to remain silent and require that Murphy's 
answers to Widseth's questions not be used against him 
in a subsequent criminal prosecution. At a minimum, I 
think we should leave the policy choice whether to 
permit a probationer to remain silent or to prohibit 
silence but immunize the compelled answers to the 
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Minnesota Supreme Court. In the absence of any 
authoritative decisions on this point, I would not 
assume, as you do, that Minnesota would be content to 
let its probationers remain silent when asked questions 
about their compliance with their conditions of 
probation. And in the absence of an authoritative 
decision, I would be hard pressed to say, as you do, 
that Murphy could not have reasonably believed that 
Minnesota might decide to treat silence as a basis for 
revocation of his probation. 
In sum, I am still not entirely at rest in this 
case and will wait to see what the dissent has to say. 
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letter with some care, but 
thrust of several of your 
First, the question whether §4582 was violated in 
this case and the proper remedy for violations of the 
section are not before us in this case. I am uncertain 
whether the record supports your observation that the 
probation officer may have been somewhat deceptive in 
circumventing the protection of the section. As the 
draft opinion makes clear, I am of the view that "there 
is no evidence that she used treatment as a subterfuge 
or that her sole purpose was to obtain incriminating 
statements for the police." However, I would be will-
ing to consider any specific suggestion you have in 
this regard. 
Second, I am uncertain why you direct your 
comments concerning Murphy's knowledge or state of mind 
to part II (B) (1) of the draft. That section is 
designed to demonstrate only that the situation facing 
Murphy was sufficiently unlike custodial interrogation 
to render inapplicable the rule excusing a failure to 
assert the privilege in a timely manner. I do not 
believe that the arguments made in part II(B) (1) depend 
on, or amount to, a conclusion about Murphy's belief as 
to whether he could refuse to answer questions that 




Third, the circulating draft does not purport to 
announce any definitive construction of Murphy's parole 
conditions as they bear on the Fifth Amendment 
privilege. To the contrary, it is noted that the 
Minnesota court has not construed the parole conditions 
as requiring a waiver of the privilege and indicates 
that we will not assume that such is the import of 
those conditions, particularly where the Attorney 
General of the state is of a contrary view. Absent the 
revocation sanction for a refusal to incriminate, the 
draft rejects Murphy's argument that he was excused 
from claiming the privilege for fear of a penalty. We 
do go on to say that if Murphy feared revocation as a 
consequence of his exercise of the privilege, his 
belief was not reasonable as a matter of law. 
Thus, if the votes are there, I should prefer to 
leave the draft as it is. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Stevens 
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OF MINNESOTA 
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JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting. 
The opinion of the Court helpfully clarifies the scope of the 
privilege against self-incrimination that may be asserted by a 
probationer when asked questions by an officer of the state. 
As the majority points out, two principles shape the proba-
tioner's constitutional rights. First, because probation revo-
cation proceedings are not criminal in nature, Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, 411 U. S. 778, 782 (1973), and because the Fifth-
Amendment ban on compelled self-incrimination applies only 
to criminal proceedings, the possibility that a truthful answer 
to a question might result in the revocation of his probation 
does not accord the probationer a constitutional right to 
refuse to respond. Ante, at 14, n. 7. Second, a probationer 
retains the privilege enjoyed by all citizens to refuse "to an-
swer official questions put to him in any ... proceeding, civil 
or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might in-
criminate him in future criminal proceedings," Lefkowitz v. 
Turley, 414 U. S. 70, 77 (1973). Ante, at 5. 
From the foregoing propositions, it follows that the power 
of a state to compel a probationer to answer a given question 
varies depending upon the manner in which the probationer's 
answer might incriminate him. If a truthful response might 
reveal that he has violated a condition of his probation but 
would not subject him to criminal prosecution, the state may 
insist that he respond and may penalize him for refusing to do 
~ ,I 
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so. 1 See ante, at 14, n. 7. By contrast, if there is a chance 
that a truthful answer to a given question would expose the 
probationer to liability for a crime different from the crime 
for which he has already been convicted, he has a right to 
refuse to answer and the state may not attempt to coerce him 
to forgo that right. 2 See ante, at 14. As the majority 
points out, if the answer to a question might lead both to 
criminal sanctions and to parole revocation, the state has the 
option of insisting that the probationer respond, in return for 
an express guarantee of immunity from criminal liability. 3 
Ante, at 15, n. 7. Unless it exercises that option, however, 
the state may not interfere with the probationer's right "to 
remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered ex-
ercise of his own will," Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1, 8 
(1964). 
The flaw in the opinion of the Court lies not in its analysis 
of the constitutional rights available to a probationer, but in 
its finding that those rights were not violated in this case. 
The majority concludes that, "since Murphy revealed incrimi-
nating information instead of timely asserting his Fifth 
Amendment privilege, his disclosures were not compelled in-
' This is not to suggest that a state must or should organize its probation 
system in a fashion that compels probationers to respond under these cir-
cumstances, only that a state is not prevented by the Federal Constitution 
from doing so. 
2 It makes no difference whether the criminal conduct that the proba-
tioner might reveal was committed before or after the crime for which he 
was convicted or before or after the conviction itself. 
3 I remain persuaded that "the Fifth Amendment's privilege against 
self-incrimination requires that any jurisdiction that compels a man to in-
criminate himself grant him absolute immunity under its laws from pros-
ecution for any transaction revealed in that testimony." Piccirillo v. New 
York , 400 U. S. 548, 562 (1971) (BRENNAN, J ., joined by MARSHALL, J. , 
dissenting). A majority of the Court, however, adheres to the view that 
the constitutional prohibition is not violated as long as the witness is ac-
corded immunity against the use, in a criminal prosecution, of his testi-
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criminations." Ante, at 19. In my view, that conclusion is 
inconsistent with our prior cases dealing with invocations of 
the Fifth Amendment. For two independent reasons, Mur-
phy's failure to claim his privilege against self-incrimination 
before responding to his probation officer's inquiry regarding 
his participation in the 1974 murder did not result in the for-
feiture of his right to object to the use of his admissions in a 
subsequent criminal prosecution. First, the State of Minne-
sota had threatened Murphy with a penalty for refusing to re-
spond to questions; our decisions make clear that such a 
threat relieves its target of the duty to claim the benefit of 
the Fifth Amendment. Second, under the circumstances of 
this case, the State was obliged to prove that Murphy was 
aware of his constitutional rights and freely waived them; by 
showing nothing more than that Murphy failed to assert his 
privilege before answering, the State failed to carry its 
burden. 
I 
As the majority acknowledges, if an officer of a state asks a 
person a question under circumstances that deprive him of a 
"'free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer,"' and 
he answers the question without attempting to assert his 
privilege against self-incrimination, his response will be 
deemed to have been "compelled" and will be inadmissible as 
evidence against him. Garner v. United States, 424 U. S. 
648, 656-657 (1976) (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 
219, 241 (1941)); see ante, at 8. Our cases make clear that 
the state will be found to have deprived the person of such a 
"free choice" if it threatens him with a substantial sanction if 
he refuses to respond. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U. S., at 
82-83. Two rules flow from the foregoing principle: If the 
state presents a person with the "Robson's choice" of incrimi-
nating himself or suffering a penalty, and he nevertheless 
refuses to respond, the state cannot constitutionally make 
good on its threat to penalize him. Id., at 77; Uniformed 
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U. S. 280, 284 (1968); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U. S. 273, 
277-278 (1968). Conversely, if the threatened person de-
cides to talk instead of asserting his privilege, the state can-
not use his admissions against him in a subsequent criminal 
prosecution. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U. S. 493, 500 
(1967). 
It might appear that these two rules would defeat one an-
other. A person presented with what appears to be a Hob-
son's choice could be charged with the knowledge that, under 
this Court's precedents, he may choose either option with im-
punity. His awareness that the state can use neither his si-
lence nor his confessions against him would seem to eliminate 
the "compulsion" supposedly inherent in the situation. 4 
More specifically, it might be argued that, because it is now 
settled that a person cannot be penalized for asserting his 
Fifth-Amendment privilege, if he decides to talk rather than 
assert his constitutional right to remain silent, his statements 
should be deemed voluntary. 
This Court has consistently refused to allow the two rules 
to undercut each other in this way. 5 Our refusal derives 
from two considerations. First, many-probably most-of 
the persons threatened with sanctions if they refuse to 
answer official questions lack sufficient knowledge of this 
' See Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tommorrow: The Case for Con-
stitutional Change, 37 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 671, 708 (1968); Spevak v. Klein, 
385 u. s. 511 , 531 (1967) (WHITE , J ., dissenting). 
5 Thus, in Lefkowitz v. Turley , supra, the Court described its prior deci-
sion in Gardner v. Broderick, supra, in the following terms: "Although 
under Garrity any waiver executed may have been invalid and any answers 
elicited inadmissible in evidence, the state did not purport to recognize as 
much and instead attempted to coerce a waiver on the penalty of loss of 
employment. . . . Hence, the state's statutory provision requiring [appel-
lant's] dismissal for his refusal to waive immunity could not stand." 414 
U. S., at 80-81. In the same opinion, the Court acknowledged that the 
rule announced in Garrity itselfremained good law. See id., at 79-80, 82. 
The Court today does not question the vitality of either the line of cases 
originating in Gardner or the line originating in Garrity. 
-
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Court's decisions to be aware that the state's threat is idle. 
Second, the state's attempt to coerce self-incriminating state-
ments by promising to penalize silence is itself constitution-
ally offensive, and the mere possibility that the state profited 
from the attempt is sufficient to forbid it to make use of the 
admissions it elicited. See Gardner v. Broderick, supra, at 
279. 
For similar reasons, when a person who has been threat-
ened with a penalty makes self-incriminating statements, we 
have declined to inquire whether his decision to speak was 
the proximate result of the threat. In most cases, it would 
be difficult for the person to prove that, but for the threat, he 
would have held his peace and that no other intervening 
causes (such as pangs of conscience) induced him to confess. 6 
The state, having exerted pressures repugnant to the Con-
stitution, should not be allowed to profit from the uncertainty 
whether those pressures had their intended effect. Sensitiv-
ity to the foregoing concerns is reflected in our decision in 
Garrity v. New Jersey, supra. The petitioners in that case 
had never argued that their confessions were in fact induced 
by the state's warning that they might be fired if they re-
fused to answer, and the lower courts had not so found. 7 
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the petitioners' 
6 Such proof would be especially difficult in cases in which the defendant 
has confessed to a serious crime, thereby subjecting himself to a penalty-
in the form of protracted incarceration-far more severe than the penalty 
that the state threatened to impose if he refused to answer. Despite the 
implausibility, under such circumstances, of an allegation that the state's 
threat induced the confession, we have never suggested that the defendant 
would be unable to avail himself of the doctrine enunciated in Garrity. In-
deed, the situation presented in Garrity itself fit the scenario just 
described. 
1 As Justice Harlan observed in dissent, "All of the petitioners con-
sented to give statements, none displayed any significant hesitation, and 
none suggested that the decision to offer information was motivated by the 
possibility of discharge. " 385 U. S. , at 505. The majority did not ques-
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statements "were infected by the coercion inherent in this 
scheme of questioning and caryiot be sustained as voluntary," 
385 U. S., at 497-498 (footnote omitted). 
In sum, the majority errs when it suggests that, to claim 
the benefit of the Fifth Amendment, a person who made self-
incriminating statements after being threatened with a pen-
alty if he remained silent must show that his apprehension 
that the state would carry out its promise was objectively 
"reasonable," ante, at 17. Our decisions make clear that the 
threat alone is sufficient to render all subsequent testimony 
"compelled." See supra, at 4-5. 8 Likewise, the majority 
errs when it implies that a defendant has a duty to prove that 
the state's threat, and not some other motivation, prompted 
his confession, see ante, at 17. Under our precedents, the 
defendant need only prove that the state presented him with 
a constitutionally impermissible choice and that he thereupon 
incriminated himself. See supra, at ~-
When the foregoing principles are applied to this case, it 
becomes clear that Murphy's confession to the 1974 murder 
must be deemed to have been "compelled." When Murphy 
was placed on probation, he was given a letter setting forth 
the conditions under which he was discharged. The perti-
nent portions of the letter provide: 
"For the present, you are only conditionally released. 
If you comply with the conditions of your probation you 
may expect to be discharged at the expiration of the pe-
riod stated. If you fail to comply with the requirements 
8 Cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478, 499 (1964) (WHITE, J., dissent-
ing) ("If an accused is told he must answer and does not know better, it 
would be very doubtful that the resulting admissions could be used against 
him"). 
A similar principle obtains in the Fourth-Amendment context. It is 
well established that a "consent" to a search that consists of nothing more 
than submission to the "presumed authority" of a colorably valid search 
warrant is invalid. E. g., Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U. S. 319, 
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you may be returned to Court at any time for further 
hearing or commitment .... 
"It will be necessary for you to obey strictly the 
following conditions: 
"BE TRUTHFUL to your Probation Officer in all mat-
ters." App. to Pet. for Cert. C 33-34 (emphasis in 
original). 
Murphy was required to sign the letter, attesting that he had 
read and understood the instructions. Id., at C-34. 
The majority contends that the foregoing passages merely 
required Murphy to answer nonincriminating questions and 
forbade him to make false statements to his probation officer. 
Ante, at 16. The majority's interpretation, which is essen-
tial to its result, is simply incredible. A reasonable layman 
would interpret the imperative, "be truthful ... in all mat-
ters," as a command to answer honestly all questions pre-
sented. Any ambiguity inherent in the language of the di-
rective is dispelled by its context. The duty to be truthful in 
dealings with the probation officer is listed as the first term 
of the conditions of probation. The critical phrase is capital-
ized. And the injunction is immediately preceded by an in-
struction "to obey strictly the following conditions." 9 
In short, the State of Minnesota presented Murphy with a 
set of official instructions that a reasonable man would have 
interpreted to require him, upon pain of the revocation of his 
probation, to answer truthfully all questions asked by his 
• The Solicitor General observes: "Citizens are often required to be 
truthful in their dealings with the government; any person commits a crime 
if, for example, he makes a false statement to a federal law enforcement 
officer in connection with a matter within the officer's jurisdiction. 18 
U. S. C. 1001." Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae 19. It is 
precisely because such prosciptions on lying to government officals are so 
common that the emphatic injunction contained in Murphy's probation con-
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probation officer. 10 Probation revocation surely constitutes a 
"substantial sanction." 11 Under our precedents, therefore, 
by threatening Murphy with that sanction if he refused to an-
swer, Minnesota deprived itself of constitutional authority to 
use Murphy's subsequent answers in a criminal prosecution 
against him. 
10 No Minnesota court has authoritatively interpreted either the proba-
tion condition at issue or the Minnesota statute from which it derives. 
Nor can a definitive construction of these crucial aspects of state Jaw be 
found in the opinions of either the trial court or the Minnesota Supreme 
Court in this case. After cataloguing the considerations on which it 
founded its ruling that Murphy's confession was admissible, the trial court 
observed: "Against these factors is the fact that a condition of his probation 
was that he be honest with his probation officer, and that he was there os-
tensibly to discuss further treatment in regard to his current probation. 
Failure to follow through with either of these could have resulted in revo-
cation of the probation and potential imprisonment." App. to Pet. for 
Cert. B-14. The foregoing passage suggests that the trial court assumed 
that Murphy was under a duty to answer all questions presented by his 
probation officer, but is too ambiguous to be fairly relied upon as an "inter-
pretation" of the probation condition. Because the State Supreme Court 
held Murphy's confession inadmissible for different reasons, it did not have 
occasion to decide whether a refusal to answer the questions asked by his 
probation officer would have exposed Murphy to revocation of his proba-
tion. The majority professes to be "hesitant," "[w]ithout the benefit of an 
authoritative state-court construction of the condition," to construe it to 
impose upon Murphy a duty to answer in addition to a duty not to lie. 
Ante, at 16. For the reasons indicated in the text, I do not share the ma-
jority's hesitation; it seems to me clear that a reasonable man would have 
interpreted the letter to require him to answer all questions. But even if I 
agreed that the import of the crucial phrase is not apparent, I would object 
to the majority's disposition of the case. The proper course would be to 
remand to the Minnesota Supreme Court to allow it to provide an "authori-
tative construction" of the provisions of state law around which the dispute 
revolves. 
11 Even the critics of the line of cases forbidding use of statements made 
after a state threatened a witness with an economic sanction acknowledge 
that a state may not threaten to put a person in jail for refusing to answer 
questions. See Friendly, 37 U. Cinn. L. Rev., at 676; Greenawalt, Silence 
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The majority's efforts to avoid that conclusion are unper-
suasive. First, the majority faults Murphy for failing to ask 
his probation officer for a "clarification" of the terms of his 
probation. Ante, at 16. The letter by which the State in-
formed Murphy of the terms of his probation contained no 
suggestion that he was entitled to such a "clarification"; on 
the contrary, the letter informed Murphy that he was re-
quired to "obey strictly" the conditions enumerated and that 
failure to do so might result in his "commitment." More im-
portantly, as indicated above, our decisions establish that a 
person told by the state that he may be penalized for refusing 
to answer does not bear the responsibility to determine 
whether the state would or could make good on its threat. 
See supra, at 4-5. Second, the majority relies on the ab-
sence of "direct evidence that Murphy confessed because he 
feared that his probation would be revoked if he remained si-
lent." Ante, at 17. Under our precedents, no such "direct 
evidence" of a causal link between the threat and the re-
sponse is required in order to prevent the use in a criminal 
prosecution of Murphy's confession. See supra, at 5-6. 
In conclusion, because the terms of Murphy's probation de-
prived him of "a free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to 
answer" when his probation officer confronted him with the 
allegation that he had committed the 1974 murder, our deci-
sions forbid the introduction into evidence against him of his 
confession. 
II 
Even if Minnesota had not impaired Murphy's freedom to 
respond or to refuse to respond to incriminating questions re-
garding the 1974 murder, I would hold his confession inad-
missible because, in view of the circumstances under which 
he was interrogated, the State had a duty to prove that Mur-
phy waived his privilege against self-incrimination, and it has 
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It is now settled that, in most contexts, the privilege 
against self-incrimination is not self-executing. "[I]n the or-
dinary case," if a person questioned by an officer of the state 
makes damaging disclosures instead of asserting his privi-
lege, he forfeits his right to object to subsequent use of his 
admissions against him. Garner v. United States , 424 U. S., 
at 654. This forfeiture occurs even if the person is subject to 
a general legal duty to respond to the officer's questions. 
See United States v. Washington , 431 U. S. 181 (1977); ante, 
at 6. And it occurs regardless of whether the person's fail-
ure to claim the privilege was founded upon a knowing and 
intelligent decision to waive his constitutional right not to an-
swer those questions that might incriminate him. Garner v. 
United States, supra, at 654, n. 9; see also ante, at 6-7. 
At first blush, this harsh doctrine seems incompatible with 
our repeated assertions of the importance of the Fifth-
Amendment privilege in our constitutional scheme. Twenty 
years ago, we observed: 
"[T]he American system of criminal prosecution is accu-
satorial, not inquisitorial, and . . . the Fifth Amendment 
privilege is its essential mainstay .... Governments , 
state and federal, are thus constitutionally compelled to 
establish guilt by evidence independently and freely se-
cured, and may not by coercion prove a charge against 
an accused out of his own mouth. " Malloy v. Hogan , 
378 U. S., 7-8 (citation omitted). 
In view of our continued adherence to the foregoing princi-
ples, 12 it appears anomalous that, in most contexts, we allow 
governments to take advantage of witnesses' failure , some-
times as a result of ignorance or momentary inattention, to 
claim the benefit of the privilege in a "timely'' fashion. 
The explanation for our seemingly callous willingness to 
countenance forfeitures of Fifth-Amendment rights must be 
12 See, e. g., Garner v. United States, supra, at 655-656. 
-
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sought in a combination of three factors. First and most im-
portantly, we presume that most people are aware that they 
need not answer an official question when a truthful answer 
might expose them to criminal prosecution. "At this point in 
our history virtually every schoolboy is familiar with the con-
cept, if not the language," of the constitutional ban on com-
pelled self-incrimination. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 
433, 439 (1974). We thus take for granted that, in most in-
stances, when a person discloses damaging information in re-
sponse to an official inquiry, he has made an intelligent deci-
sion to waive his Fifth-Amendment rights. 
Second, in the vast majority of situations in which an offi-
cer of the state asks a citizen a question, the officer has no 
reason to know that a truthful response would reveal that the 
citizen has committed a crime. Under such circumstances, 
one of the central principles underlying the Fifth Amend-
ment-that governments should not "deliberately seek[] to 
avoid the burdens of independent investigation by compelling 
self-incriminating disclosures"-has little relevance. Garner 
v. United States, supra, at 655-656. Thus, in the ordinary 
case, few constitutional values are threatened when the gov-
ernment fails to preface an inquiry with an explicit reminder 
that a response is not required if it might expose the respond-
ent to prosecution. 
Third, a general requirement that government officials 
preface all questions with such reminders would be highly 
burdensome. Our concern with the protection of constitu-
tional rights should not blind us to the fact that, in general, 
governments have the right to everyone's testimony. E. g., 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 688 (1972). A rule re-
quiring officials, before asking citizens for information, to tell 
them that they need not reveal incriminating evidence would 
unduly impede the capacity of government to gather the data 
it needs to function effectively. 13 
13 It might be argued that no such general rule would be required to en-
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In sum, a general rule requiring the prosecution, before in-
troducing a confession, to prove that the defendant intelli-
gently and voluntarily waived his right not to incriminate 
himself would protect few persons (because most know their 
legal rights), would do little to promote the values that un-
derlie the Fifth Amendment, and would substantially impair 
the information-gathering capacity of government. 14 
It should be apparent that these considerations do not 
apply with equal force in all contexts. Until today, the 
Court has been sensitive to variations in their relevance and 
strength. Accordingly, we have adhered to the general 
principle that a defendant forfeits his privilege if he fails to 
intelligent decisions to waive their constitutional rights. All that would be 
necessary would be a rule forbidding the state to make any use of a self-
incriminating disclosure in a prosecution against its maker unless he had 
been reminded of his privilege before making the statement. The police 
(and other officials) would be free to ask questions without accompanying 
warnings. If the persons questioned made damaging disclosures, the 
prosecution could not use their statements against them, but the state 
would thereby be in no worse position that if the questions had not been 
asked at all. The police would simply be obliged thereupon to conduct an 
independent investigation, and to secure a conviction on the basis of 
"evidence independently and freely secured," see Malloy v. Hogan, 
supra, at 8. 
The response to the foregoing argument is that, in a situation of the sort 
just described, the state would indeed be in a significantly worse position 
than if the questions had not been asked. The reason is that, in a subse-
quent prosecution, the state would bear the burden of proving that it made 
no use whatever of the incriminating disclosures. See Kasti,gar v. United 
States, 406 U. S. 441, 460 (1972). The difficulty of sustaining that burden 
would often be such as wholly to frustrate prosecution. See Westen & 
Mandell, To Talk, To Balk, or To Lie: The Emerging Fifth Amendment 
Doctrine of the "Preferred Response," 19 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 521 , 531-532 
(1982). Desire to avoid such situations would induce government officials 
either to preface their questions with warnings or to refrain from asking 
them at all. The net effect would be to reduce the capacity of government 
to obtain needed information. 
" Cf. Schneckloth v. Bustam ante, 412 U. S. 218, 227-234, 242 (1973) (re-
fusing, for similar reasons, to adopt a waiver standard for testing the vol-
untariness of consents to searches). 
-
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assert it before making incriminating statements only in situ-
ations implicating several of the factors that support the prin-
ciple. More specifically, we have applied the principle only 
in cases in which at least two of the following statements 
have been true: (a) At the time the damaging disclosures 
were made, the defendant's constitutional right not to make 
them was clearly established. (b) The defendant was given 
sufficient warning that he would be asked potentially incrimi-
nating questions to be able to secure legal advice and to re-
flect upon how he would respond. (c) The environment in 
which the questions were asked did not impair the defend-
ant's ability intelligently to exercise his rights. (d) The 
questioner had no reason to assume that truthful responses 
would be self-incriminating. 
A review of a few of the leading cases should suffice to es-
tablish the point. 15 In United States v. Kordel, 397 U. S. 1 
(1970), the Government submitted interrogatories to the de-
fendant in a civil suit. Though the defendant (a corporate 
officer) was aware that the government was planning to 
bring a criminal action against him, he answered the ques-
tions instead of asserting his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. The Court ruled that his answers could be admitted in 
the ensuing prosecution. In so holding, the Court empha-
sized the facts that established law made clear that the de-
fendant had a constitutional right, to refuse to answer the in-
terrogatories, that he was free to consult with counsel before 
responding, and that nothing in the circumstances under 
which the questions were presented impaired the defendant's 
ability to appreciate the consequences of his actions. Id., at 
7, 9-10. 
15 I do not renounce the views I expressed in concurrence or dissent in 
several of the cases discussed below. My purpose in canvassing the rele-
vant decisions is simply to demonstrate that, even under the analysis 
adopted by the majorities in those cases, the result reached by the Court 
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The defendant in Garner v. United States , 424 U. S. 648 
(1976), was a professional gambler who made incriminating 
disclosures on his Form 1040 income tax returns. The Court 
held that he could be prosecuted partly on the basis of his ad-
rruss10ns. Though the defendant's constitutional right to 
refuse to provide the requested information was perhaps less 
clear and straightforward than the right of the usual defend-
ant, the Court stressed that other factors rendered inexcus-
able his failure to learn and assert his entitlements. Thus, 
the Court pointed out that the defendant was free to consult 
with a lawyer and could fill out the tax return at his leisure in 
an environment of his choosing. Id. , at 658. Moreover, 
every taxpayer is required to fill out a Form 1040; the gov-
ernment, in imposing that duty, has no reason to assume that 
any given taxpayer's responses will be self-incriminating. 
Thus, the United States in Garner could not be faulted for 
requesting the information that the defendant provided. 
Finally, in United States v. Washington, 431 U. S. 181 
(1977), the Court confirmed the proposition that a witness 
called to testify before a grand jury must claim the benefit of 
the privilege or forfeit it. 16 The Court acknowledged that 
"the grand jury room engenders an atmosphere conducive to 
truthtelling" and thus might have exerted some pressure on 
the defendant not to assert his right s. Id., at 187. In addi-
tion, the Court recognized that the Government was not 
blameless insofar as a criminal investigation had focused on 
the defendant and thus the questioners had ample reason to 
believe that truthful answers by the defendant would be self-
incriminating. 17 But, the Court reasoned, the situation con-
16 Prior to Washington, that proposition had frequently been advanced in 
dictum. See, e.g. , United States v. Mandujano, 425 U. S. 564, 574-575 
(1976) (dictum); R ogers v. United States, 340 U. S. 367, 370 (1951) (alter-
native holding); United States v. Monia, 317 U. S. 424, 427 (1943) 
(dictum). 
17 I remain convinced that the fact that a cr iminal investigation has fo-
cused on a grand jury witness is sufficient to tip the constitutional balance 
in favor of a requirement that the prosecution prove that any damaging dis-
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tained other safeguards that warranted adherence to the 
principle that a privilege not asserted is lost. First, the de-
fendant's right to refuse to respond had been perfectly clear; 
indeed, at the outset of the proceeding, the defendant had 
been explicitly warned of his right not to answer questions if 
his responses might incriminate him. Id., at 186, 188. 18 
Second, not only had the defendant been afforded an opportu-
nity before appearing to seek legal advice, but, at the start of 
the hearing, he was told that a lawyer would be provided for 
him if he wished and could not afford one. Id., at 183-184. 
Under those circumstances, the Court concluded that it was 
inconceivable that the defendant's decision not to assert his 
privilege was uninformed or involuntary. 19 
closures made by the witness were founded upon a knowing and intelligent 
waiver of the witness' rights. See 431 U. S., at 191 (BRENNAN, J., joined 
by MARSHALL, J., dissenting); United States v. Mandujano, supa, at 
596-602 (BRENNAN, J., joined by MARSHALL, J., concurring in the judg-
ment). However, the argument advanced in the text does not depend 
upon that conviction. 
18 The Court declined, however, to decide whether such warnings were 
constitutionally required. Id ., at 186, 190. 
19 See also Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 
113 (1927) (defendant who made incriminating disclosures when questioned 
by an immigration inspector deemed (in dictum) to have waived his privi-
lege when his right to refuse to answer was clear, he had been given ade-
quate notice of the sort of questions he would be asked, and he was repre-
sented by counsel at the hearing); United States v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 
141, 148 (1931) (when defendant was summoned to appear before revenue 
agent, consulted with counsel just prior to the interview, and clearly had a 
right not to incriminate himself, his failure to invoke the Fifth Amendment 
as a justification for his refusal to answer resulted in a waiver of his privi-
lege) (dictum); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U. S. 341 (1976) (incrimi-
nating disclosures made by taxpayer who was interviewed in his home and 
place of business by Internal Revenue agents after being reminded of his 
Fifth-Amendment rights held admissible in a prosecution against him); Or-
egon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492 (1977) (per curiam) (parolee's confession 
to a police officer held admissible where parolee was not in custody at the 
time of the questioning, parolee had ample warning that he would be asked 
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By contrast, in cases in which only one of the statements 
enumerated above, see supra, at 13, has been true, the Court 
has refused to adhere to the general rule that a privilege not 
claimed is lost, and instead has insisted upon a showing that 
the defendant made a knowing and intelligent decision to 
forgo his constitutional right not to incriminate himself. The 
classic situation of this sort is custodial interrogation. In 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), the Court ac-
knowledged that the right of a suspect in police custody not 
to answer questions is well established. However, we 
stressed that other aspects of the situation impair the ability 
of the suspect to exercise his rights and threaten the values 
underlying the Fifth Amendment: the suspect is unable to 
consult with counsel regarding how he should respond to 
questions; the environment in which the questions are pre-
sented (the police station, from which the suspect is forbid-
den to leave) "work[s] to undermine the individual's will to 
resist and to compel him to speak where he would not other-
wise do so freely," id., at 467; and the interrogators are well 
aware that truthful answers to their questions are likely to 
incriminate the suspect. In short, only one of the four cir-
cumstances favoring application of the general principle exist 
in the context of custodial interrogation. To mitigate the 
respond); Roberts v. United States, 445 U. S. 552, 554 (1980) (in a case in 
which the Government had "no substantial reason to believe that the re-
quested disclosures [were] likely to be incriminating," and the defendant 
clearly had a right not to incriminate himself, the defendant's refusal to an-
swer without asserting his privilege held properly used against him in the J _.......,--
determination of his sentence). ~-
The presence of two of the four safeguards likewise legitimates the set-
tled principle that a citizen not in custody who is asked potentially incrimi-
nating questions by a police officer must claim the benefit of the Fifth 
Amendment instead of answering if he wishes to retain his privilege. 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 477-478 (1966). Under such circum-
stances, not only does the citizen have a well-established right to refuse to 
answer, but the environment is not such as to discourage or frustrate the 
assertion of his right. See id., at 478. 
-
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risk that suspects would ignorantly or involuntarily fail to 
claim their privilege against self-incrimination under these 
circumstances, the Court in Miranda imposed a requirement 
that they be shown to have freely waived their rights after 
being fully apprised of them. Id., at 475--479. 20 
B 
If we remain sensitive to the concerns implicit in the fore-
going pattern of cases, we should insist that the State, in the 
instant case, demonstrate that Murphy intelligently waived 
his right to remain silent. None of the four conditions that 
favor application of the principle that a defendant forfeits his 
privilege if he fails to claim it before confessing can be found 
in the circumstances under which Murphy was interrogated. 
First, the existence and scope of Murphy's constitutional 
20 A less well-known situation involving a similar paucity of safeguards 
against inadvertent or uninformed abandonment of constitutional rights is 
that presented in Smith v. United States, 337 U. S. 137 (1949), and 
Emspak v. United States, 349 U. S. 190 (1955). In each case, the defend-
/\. ant was summoned to testify before an official body l ppeared, and early in 
) the proceeding invoked his privilege against self-incrimination. Question-
ing continued (in one case under a grant of immunity, in the other on unre-
lated topics). Later in the proceeding, the defendant was asked whether 
he wished to claim the privilege with regard to a specific substantive ques-
tion. In each case, three factors reduced the defendant's ability, at that 
point, intelligently to exercise his constitutional rights and rendered the 
activities of his interrogators constitutionally suspect: the defendant's right 
to refuse to answer the question at issue was unclear; the environment in 
which the questions were presented was moderately coercive; and the na-
ture of the proceeding as well as the defendant's prior assertion of his privi-
lege against self-incrimination alerted the questioner to the likelihood that 
a truthful answer to the crucial question would expose the defendant to 
criminal liability. In both cases, the Court held that the defendant could J ~ 
be prosecuted on the basis of his answer to the decisive question only if the 
government were able to demonstrate that he had made a sufficiently un-
equivocal and intellient waiver of his Fifth-Amendment right to satisfy the 
standard enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458, 464 (1938) ("an 
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege"). 
In both instances, the Court concluded that the government had failed to 
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right to refuse to testify were at best unclear when he ap-
peared in the probation officer's office. It is undisputed that 
the conditions of Murphy's probation imposed on him a duty 
to answer all questions presented by his probation officer ex-
cept those implicating his Fifth-Amendment rights. 21 What 
exactly those rights were was far from apparent. The ma-
jority opinion in this case constitutes the first authoritative 
analysis of the privilege against self-incrimination available 
to a probationer. The ambiguity of scope of that privilege 
prior to today is suggested by the fact the Solicitor General, 
appearing as amicus curiae, seriously misconceived the 
rights that might have been asserted by Murphy when exam-
ined by his probation officer. 22 If, after being afforded sub-
stantial opportunity for research and reflection, the lawyers 
who represent the Nation err in their explication of the rele-
vant constitutional principles, Murphy surely cannot be 
charged with knowledge of his entitlements. 23 
21 The majority construes Murphy's probation conditions to impose on 
him a general duty to respond to questions, but to contain an exemption for 
questions that impinged upon his Fifth-Amendment rights. Ante, at 
1~16. The State of Minnesota, in its brief in this case, adopts the same 
interpretation. See Brief for Petitioner 3&-38 (arguing that probationers 
in Minnesota are obliged to answer all questions asked by their probation 
officers except those to which they may assert "valid" claims of privilege). 
Though I find that construction implausible, see Part I, supra, I assume it 
for present purposes. The point made here is simply that, at the time 
Murphy was interrogated, the scope of his Fifth-Amendment right-and 
therefore the scope of the hypothesized exemption from the general duty to 
answer-was ambiguous. 
22 The Solicitor argued in the alternative that, "[ w ]hen a person has been 
convicted of a crime, his constitutional rights can be limited to the extent 
reasonably necessary to accommodate the government's penal and rehabili-
tative interests," and therefore that the government may constitutionally 
exert upon a probationer pressures to incriminate himself that it could not 
exert upon a citizen who had not been convicted of a crime. Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae 8; see id., at 27-32. That proposition is 
definitively rejected by the Court today. 
23 Cf. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U. S. 449, 466 (1975) ("A layman may not 
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Second, contrary to the suggestion of the majority, ante, at 
11, Murphy was given no warning that he would be asked po-
tentially incriminating questions. The letter in which Mur-
phy's probation officer instructed him to make an appoint-
ment informed him that the purpose of the meeting was "[t]o 
further discuss a treatment plan for the remainder of [his] 
probation." App. to Pet. for Cert. C--36. In view of the 
fact that Murphy remained under a legal obligation to attend 
treatment sessions, 24 there was no reason why he should have 
assumed from the letter that the officer planned to question 
him regarding prior criminal activity. 25 In short, prior to the 
moment he was asked whether he had committed the mur-
der, Murphy had no reason to suspect that he would be 
obliged to respond to incriminating questions. He thus had 
no opportunity to consult a lawyer, or even to consider how 
he should proceed. 
Third, the environment in which the questioning occurred 
impaired Murphy's ability to recognize and claim his constitu-
tional rights. It is true, as the majority points out, that the 
discussion between a probation officer and a probationer is 
likely to be less coercive and intimidating than a discussion 
between a police officer and a suspect in custody. Ante, at 
10, 12. But it is precisely in that fact that the danger lies. 
In contrast to the inherently adversarial relationship be-
tween a suspect and a policeman, the relationship between a 
probationer and the officer to whom he reports is likely to in-
corporate elements of confidentiality, even friendship . . In-
deed, many probation officers deliberately cultivate such 
"' Contrary to the majority's suggestion, ante, at 11, nothing in the 
record indicates that the probation officer had "excused" Murphy from the 
condition of probation that required him "to pursue . . . Alpha treatment," 
App. to Pet. for Cert. C-35; the Minnesota Supreme Court found merely 
that she had agreed not to seek revocation of his probation because of his 
breach of that condition, see State v. Murphy, 324 N. W. 2d 340, 341 
(1982). 
25 Indeed, for reasons discussed infra, at 21, it appears that the letter 
was shrewdly designed to prevent Murphy from discerning in advance the 




MINNESOTA v. MURPHY 
-
bonds with their charges. 26 The point should not be over-
stated; undoubtedly, few probationers are entirely blind to 
the fact that their probation officers are "peace officer[s], ... 
allied, to a greater or lesser extent, with [their] fellow peace 
officers." Fare v. Michael C., 442 U. S. 707, 720 (1979). 
On the other hand, many probationers develop "relation-
ship[s] of trust and confidence" with their officers. Id., at 
722. '1:7 Through abuse of that trust, a probation officer can 
elicit admissions from a probationer that the probationer 
would be unlikely to make to a hostile police interrogator. 
The instant case aptly illustrates the danger.- Before she 
sent her letter to Murphy asking him to make an appoint-
ment, the probation officer had decided to try to induce him 
to confess to the 1974 killing and to turn over that informa-
tion to the police. She was aware that, if she were success-
ful, Murphy would soon be arrested and tried for murder. 28 
There was thus no prospect whatsoever that the information 
she elicited would be used to design a treatment program to 
be followed by Murphy during the remainder of his proba-
tion. Yet, in her letter, she described the purpose of the 
meeting as that of "discuss[ing] a treatment plan." When 
Murphy arrived at the meeting, she persisted in the deceit; 
instead of informing him at once what she intended to do with 
his anticipated confession to the 1974 murder, she told him 
that "her main concern was to talk to him about the relation-
26 See A. Smith & L. Berlin, Introduction to Probation and Parole 
116--119 (1979); Mangrum, The Humanity of Probation Officers, Fed. Prob. 
47 (June 1972); Note, Observations on the Administration of Parole, 79 
Yale L. J . 698, 704-708 (1970); cf. People v. Parker, 82 A. D. 2d 661, 667, 
442 N. Y. S. 2d 803, 807 (1981), aff'd, 57 N. Y. 2d 815, 441 N. E. 2d 1118 
(1982). 
27 The relationship at issue in Fare was that between-a probation officer 
and a juvenile probationer. But many of the Court's observations can be 
extended to the relationship between an officer and an adult probationer. 
See n. 26, supra. 
28 Indeed, when Murphy refused to turn himself in, it was his probation 
officer who secured the order for his arrest. 
-
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ship of the prior crime and the one of which he was convicted 
and about his need for treatment under the circumstances." 
State v. Murphy , 324 N. W. 2d 340, 341 (Minn. 1982). That 
Murphy succumbed to the deception is apparent from the se-
quence of his responses. Instead of denying responsibility 
for the 1974 killing, he admitted his guilt but sought to ex-
plain that extenuating circumstances accounted for that 
crime. Because those circumstances no longer existed, he 
argued, he had no need for further treatment. Only after 
Murphy had made his confession did the officer inform him of 
her intent to transmit that information to the police. In 
short, the environment in which the interview was conducted 
afforded the probation officer opportunities to reinforce and 
capitalize on Murphy's ignorance that he had a right to refuse 
to answer incriminating questions, and the officer deliber-
ately and effectively exploited those opportunities. 
Finally, it is indisputable that the probation officer had 
reason to know that truthful responses to her questions 
would expose Murphy to criminal liability. This case does 
not arise out of a spontaneous confession to a routine question 
innocently asked by a government official. Rather, it origi-
nates in precisely the sort of situation the Fifth Amendment 
was designed to prevent-in which a government, instead of 
establishing a defendant's guilt through independent investi-
gation, seeks to induce him, against his will, to convict him-
self out of his own mouth. 
In sum, none of the factors that, in most contexts, justify 
application of the principle that a defendant loses his Fifth-
Amendment privilege unless he claims it in a timely fashion 
are present in this case. Accordingly, the State should be 
obliged to demonstrate that Murphy knew of his constitu-
tional rights and freely waived them. Because the State 
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The criminal justice system contains safeguards that 
should minimize the damage done by the Court's decision to-
day. In the future, responsible criminal defense attorneys 
whose clients are given probation will inform those clients, in 
their final interviews, that they may disregard probation con-
ditions insofar as those conditions are inconsistent with pro-
bationers' Fifth-Amendment rights. The attorneys will then 
carefully instruct their clients on the nuances of those rights 
as we have now explicated them. 29 Armed with this knowl-
edge, few probationers will succumb to the sort of pressure 
and deceit that overwhelmed Murphy. 
Because Murphy himself had benefit of none of the safe-
guards just described, I would affirm the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Minnesota that the admission into evidence of 
the disclosures he made to his probation officer violated the 
Constitution. 
I respectfully dissent. 
29 It is to hoped, moreover, that persons currently on probation who are 
no longer represented by counsel will somehow be informed of the central 
principle established by the Court's decision: that a probationer has a right 
to refuse to respond to a question the answer to which might expose him to 
criminal prosecution unless he is granted immunity from the use of his an-
swer against him. · 
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